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INTRODUCTION
In 1999 two men in their early twenties, one from the east coast
and one from the midwest, independently contacted Professor Mil-
ton Diamond and revealed their extraordinary stories. When they
were infants, their testicles were surgically removed and their genitals
reconstructed. They were then raised as girls. As puberty approached,
they were given female hormones to make their breasts grow and to
force other female characteristics to emerge. They described their
childhood bewilderment to Professor Diamond. They had never been
comfortable as girls; they recalled always harboring inner thoughts
that they were male. However, fear had prevented them from giving a
voice to their doubts. One young man recalled asking his mother,
"Does God make mistakes?" They described the shock they felt when
in their teen years they pieced together information about their
medical conditions and learned about secret surgical procedures per-
formed on them when they were too young to remember or consent.
They mourned for the person who might have been. Like their
childhood years, their young adult years have been marked by a need
for more surgery as they try to reclaim their male gender. One young
man had gone to the "best malpractice firm" in his state, but was told
he had no case, since doctors had done the best they could, given
what they knew about his condition at the time. The other young
man, unable to afford the mastectomies, the penile implant surgery,
the male hormones he would need for the rest of his life to prevent
osteoporosis and to provide some semblance of normalcy, asked Dr.
Diamond if he could sue the doctors.' That there are others out there
like these young people prompts this article.
This article discusses the development of a surgical approach to
treating intersex infants and others with genital anomalies2 that began
1. The tapes of these interviews are on file with the authors. One young man had an-
drogen insensitivity syndrome. Within weeks of his birth his small penis and testicles
were removed and a vulva created and he was raised a girl. The other young man had
micropenis and severe hypospadias of unknown etiology. At the age of two months,
his testicles were removed and he too was raised as a girl. Both independently rejected
their female form in their teens and now live as men.
2. Intersexed individuals are those that are born with biological features simultaneously
typically male and female. For instance they might have one ovary and one testes or
gonads that contain features of both ovarian and testicular tissue. They can have
chromosomes of XXY', XO or other configurations. There are more than 1 dozen
categories of intersex. See Melvin M. Grumbach & Felix A. Conte, Disorder of Sex
Differentiation, in WmUinAMs TExrBooK OF ENDOCRINOLOGY 1303, 1331 (.D.
Wilson et al. eds., 9th ed. 1998).
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in the late 1950s and 1960s and became standard in the 1970s. Al-
though professional literature has recently questioned the surgical
approach to the treatment of infants, controversy surrounding treat-
ment persists and the medical community now is divided. How sex
reassignment surgery for intersex infants became a routine recom-
mendation of practitioners and how parents were persuaded to
consent to such radical surgeries provide a cautionary tale that is rele-
vant to both medicine and law.
Over the past four decades, early surgical intervention for infants
who are born with ambiguous genitalia or who suffer traumatic
genital injury often has been recommended as standard procedure.3
Surgical advances in this century have made it possible for physicians
to choose a gender 4 for the child and to sculpt gender-appropriate
genitalia of approximately normal-looking appearance. For the most
part, when choosing surgical treatment, physicians have opted for a
female form because it is easier to fashion female genitalia than male
Relying on a nurture-based theory of gender identity, physicians have
advised parents to surgically alter their intersexed infant and to raise
the child in a manner consistent with the child's surgically-altered
genitalia, without regard to the gender identity that might have natu-
rally developed.' The same advice has been given when a male
infant's penis has been severely mutilated by trauma or is considered
significantly small. Clinicians have assured parents that the surgical
potential for normal-looking genitalia should dictate the child's gen-
der and that any innate gender propensity of the child can be
changed by careful upbringing.
Despite a paucity of confirming evidence, medical literature
since the 1970s, has promoted this treatment. This medical literature
relied on a body of published reports which themselves were initially
predicated on studies of intersexed individuals and most significantly,
one infant's incredible case which was widely reported in medical,
psychiatric and popular literature. In 1997, the medical community
Ambiguous genitala are physical anomalies in which the genitalia are not clearly
identifiable as male or female. They are often detected at birth and are a sign of inter-
sex. Grumbach & Conte, supra, at 1401.
3. See infra notes 12, 109, 113.
4. Gender as used in this paper is a social term representing the social conditions of boy or
girl and man or woman. This is in contrast to the biological terms of male and female. It
is thus obvious that a male can live as a girl or woman and that a female 5an live as a boy
or man.
5. See infra notes 111-115.
6. See infra note 12.
7. See John Money et al., An Examination of Some Basic Sexual Concepts: the Evidence of
Human Hermaphroditism, 97 BuLL. JOHNs HoPKINs Hos'. 301, 308 (1955) ("In
place of a theory of instinctive masculinity or femininity which is innate, the
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was reacquainted with that infant who had been long lost to follow-8
up. Only then did the medical community discover that the out-
come of this single case was not as first reported. The foundation on
which this treatment rests finally began to crumble.
Part II of this article discusses the remarkable case of John/Joan (J/J),
the male infant whose penis was destroyed by a surgical accident and who
was then intentionally castrated and surgically transformed into a female-
looking infant.9 Accepted as a success, this case report had a significant
impact on the standard of care that developed for treatment of certain
intersex conditions, micropenis, and accidental penile trauma in infancy.
Unfortunately, the outcome of the case was never fully reported until
1997.10 Had the true facts been revealed earlier, or its premises been sub-
jected to more rigorous scientific inquiry, the medical standard that
developed probably would have been different.
Part III of this article discusses generally how medical standards of
care develop and how a poorly-grounded standard of care became en-
trenched through anecdotal reporting and without scientific validation.
Part III concludes with a discussion and critique of tort law's self-imposed
impotence in cases where a negligent standard of care develops because
treatment has not been subjected to scientific scrutiny. While under ordi-
nary negligence principles juries may find liability based on a profession's
collective negligence in establishing customary practices, many jurisdic-
tions accord more deference to medical standards. In jurisdictions that
require physicians to conform to standards in the medical community,
rather than to reasonable prudence, a claim that medical practice collec-
tively has deviated from common sense and the rigors of science will not
succeed. Ultimately, Part III argues that asking physicians to abide by
community standards promotes professional inertia. When treatment
practices are not validated by scientific studies, a deferential tort standard
is not appropriate.
evidence of hermaphroditism lends support to a conception that psychologically,
sexuality is undifferentiated at birth and that it becomes differentiated as masculine
or feminine in the course of the various experiences of growing up"); John Money,
Cytogenetic and Psychosexual Incongruities With A Note on Space-Form Blindness, 119
AM. J. PSYCH. 820, 820 (1963) ("It is more reasonable to suppose simply that, like
hermaphrodites, all the human race follow the same pattern, namely, of psychosexual
undifferentiation at birth."). In the early days intersexed individuals were known as
hermaphrodites and pseudohermaphrodites.
8. Milton Diamond was one of the two researchers who reintroduced the patient to the
medical literature in 1997. See Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassign-
ment at Birth: Long Tem Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARcHrvEs PnTruc
ADoiScENT Mma. 298 (1997) [hereinafter Diamond & Sigmundson, SexReassignment].
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
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Part IV explores the role of the informed consent doctrine, particu-
larly with regard to parental decision-making responsibilities for cases of
ambiguous or traumatized genitalia. Part IV suggests that the medical
community's confidence in recommending treatment, the practice of pro-
viding limited and simplistic information in order to shield and protect
parents and the sense of urgency communicated to parents all compro-
mised the ability of parents to give proper informed consent. Even more
fundamentally, decision makers failed to consider childrens' potential for
future self-determination. Compounding these already formidable in-
formed consent obstacles, clinicians also held the belief that children
would only accept the gender of assignment if they were raised in the se-
lected gender without equivocation, and thus enlisted parents as
accomplices to medical secrecy.
Part V offers the recommendations for change endorsed by critics of
early surgery, including both medical ethicists and the Intersex Society of
North America (ISNA). These recommendations give guidance to physi-
cians and parents who, on behalf of children, must make very difficult
medical decisions that have lifelong implications on sexual and gender
identity and erotic and reproductive potentials.
I. Ti REMAR CASE OF JOHN/JOAN
The contemporary medical model for dealing with cases of ambigu-
ous or traumatized genitalia started some four decades ago, but became
firmly established when the case of John/Joan" was reported in the pedi-
atric literature.
2
11. For accounts of the John/Joan case, see Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment,
supra note 8; Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexual-
ity: Guidelines for Dealing with Persons with Ambiguous Genitalia, 151 ARCHIVEs
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1046 (1997) [hereinafter Diamond & Sigmundson,
Management of Intersexuality]; Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics
and the Surgical Assignment of Sex, 9 J. CLINICAL ETuICS 398 (1998) [hereinafter
Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics]. Colapinto provides the most thorough exami-
nation of J/Js life. See John Colapinto, The True Story ofJohn/Joan, ROLLING STONE,
Dec. 11, 1997, at 54 [hereinafter Colapinto, The True Story]; see also JOHN COIA'-
INTO, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE Boy WHO WAS RAISED As A GIRL (2000)
[hereinafter COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM]; ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING
THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 66-71 (2000);
SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE: THE USE AND ABUSE OF RESEARCH INTO SEXUALITY
103-05 (1996).
Professor Greenberg discusses the case in a critique of law and medicine's rigid,
binary approach to sex and gender. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Fe-
male: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 Aiz. L. Rav. 265
(1999).
12. See SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 6 (1998) ("Virtually all
academic writing on sex and gender refers to a case first described by sexologist John
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In the early 1970s, John Money, a psychologist at The Johns Hop-
kins' Hospital, reported the case of an identical twin who lost his penis
at the age of 8 months through a surgical mishap during phimosis re-
pair.3 Along with psychologist Anka Ehrhardt, Money reported that,
following counseling, the parents consented to sex-reassignment surgery
(castration, removal of the scrotum and initial fashioning of a vulva)
and to raising their once-son, John, as their new-daughter, Joan. 4 This
Money in 1972."); Alice Domurar Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"-or Ambivalent Medi-
cine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-
June 1998, at 24, 26 (describing establishment of surgical standard).
For references to the surgical standard, see JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT,
MAN & WoMAN/Boy & GIRL THE DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER
IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY (1972) [hereinafter MONEY &
EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN]; Alan D. Perlmutter, Intersex, in UROLOGIC SURGERY
IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN 2, 15 (Lowell R. King ed., 1997); Howard McC. Snyder
III, MANAGEMENT OF AMBIGUOUS GENITALIA IN THE NEONATES, in UROLOGIC SUR-
GERY IN NEONATES & YOUNG INFANTS 346, 369-70 (Lowell R. King ed., 1988); C.
R. J. Woodhouse, Ambiguous Genitalia and Intersexuality-Micropenis, in PEDIATRIC
UROLOGY 689, 690 (Barry O'Donnell & Stephen A. Koffeds., 3d ed. 1997); Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics, Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of Male
Children with Particular Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological Effects ofSur-
gery and Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590 (1996) [hereinafter Timing of Elective
Surgery]; Patricia K. Donahoe et al., Clinical Management of Intersex Abnormalities,
28 CURRENT PROBS. SURGERY 517, 527 (1991); Kurt Newman et al., The Surgical
Management of Infants and Children With Ambiguous Genitalia: Lessons Learned from
25 Years, 215 ANNALS OF SURGERY 644 (1992); Katherine Rossiter & Shonna Diehl,
Gender Reassignment in Children: Ethical Conflicts in Surrogate Decision Making, 24
PEDIATRIC NURSING 59 (1998); Emily Nussbaum, A Question of Gender, DISCOVER,
Jan. 2000, at 92, 93-94.
13. The child's penis was "ablated flush with the abdominal wall" during an electrocau-
tery procedure which burned the entire penis, causing it to eventually necrose and
slough. See MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, supra note 12, at 118. Penile
amputation or trauma may occur through surgical or childhood mishap. They are
not common occurrences but are not rare. See, e.g., Bernardo Ochoa, Trauma of the
External Genitalia in Children: Amputation of the Penis and Emasculation, 160 J.
UROLOGY 1116 (1996) (reporting seven case studies); Joan McQueeney Mitric, Mer-
its of Circumcision A Subject ofDispute Disfigurement Lead to Two Lawsuits in Atlanta,
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1986, at Health 9 (reporting that two babies, on the same day,
were burned during circumcision and one underwent sex-change surgery because of
the severity of tissue destruction); Tracy Thompson, Two Atlanta Physicians Get Rep-
rimand Over Babies' Burns Suffered During Circumcisions, ATLANTIC J. & CONsT.,
Nov. 8, 1986, at B1.
14. The plan was developed as follows, "The parents agonized their way to a decision,
implementing it with a change of name, clothing and hair style when the baby was
seventeen months old. Four months later, the surgical first step of genital reconstruc-
tion as a female was undertaken, the second step, vaginoplasty, being delayed until
the body is full grown. Pubertal growth and feminization will be regulated by means
of hormonal replacement therapy with estrogen." MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN AND
WOMAN, supra note 12, at 118-19. The child underwent an orchiectomy (surgical
removal of testicles) and preliminary vulva surgery before age two. See Diamond &
Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 12, at 298-99.
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case is now known in the psychological and medical literature as the
John/Joan case. 5
The parents were counseled to raise the child as a girl and to pro-
vide the child only limited information:
They were broadly informed about the future medical pro-
gram for their child and how to integrate it with her sex
education as she grows older. They were guided in how to give
the child information about herself to the extent that the need
arises in the future; and they were helped with what to explain
to friends and relatives, including their other child. Eventu-
ally, they would inform their daughter that she would become
a mother by adoption, one day, when she married and wanted
to have a family.
The parents were further instructed to keep J/J's original sex a
guarded secret. In fact, the parents later reported that, in order to foster
secrecy, they were advised at the time to settle in a distant city. 7
Since the children's family did not live close to The Johns Hopkins
Hospital where Money had his office, the day-to-day care of the twins
was left in the hands of a local psychiatric team under Money's direc-
tion. Once a year the twins were brought to The Johns Hopkins
Hospital for evaluation and to insure adherence to the treatment plan. 8
As subsequently reported by Money, Joan was satisfactorily developing
15. The names are pseudonyms. See CoLAPINTo, As NATURE MADE HIM, supra note 11,
at xv; Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 299; Colapinto,
The True Story, supra note 11, at 56. Now stepping forward, John, whose real name
is David Reimer, has agreed to appear in public with the release of Colapinto's book.
Kitzinger writes on the case's widespread impact on the social sciences as well:
"The John/Joan case is still amongst the most widely cited studies in social science
textbooks on gender issues. Its popularity with textbook authors is due, in part to
the... nature of a case [which seems better suited to science fiction than science]."
Celia C. Kitzinger, Gender, Sex and Knowledge: The construction of the John/Joan Case
in Social Science Textbooks (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, on file with authors).
16. MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, supra note 12, at 119.
17. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 302. Peculiarly, in
a text published in 1968, Money discouraged counseling parents to move ".... it used
to be commented in passing that when a new announcement of sex was necessary, the
parents should move to a new town, find a new job, sever all connections with the
past, and start life anew. I have found that this formula is completely untenable."
JOHN MONEY, SEx ERRORS OF THE BODY: DILEMMAs, EDUCATION, COUNSELING 61
(1st ed. 1968) [hereinafter MONEY, SEX ERRORS 1968]. References to the second edi-
tion, published in 1994 will be cited as MONEY, SEx ERRoRs 1994.
18. See Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 68.
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as a girl in marked distinction to the other twin who was now develop-
ing as a normal boy. 9
During the child's preadolescent years, Money reported that the
parents were successfully raising the now-female child as a girl who ap-
peared typical enough although with some "tomboyish traits." 20 Money
did not report on J/J's refusal to cooperate in his counseling. Money
was apparently untroubled by some childhood conduct that, in hind-
sight, would prove prescient, such as her persistence in standing to
urinate despite her mother "teaching her how little girls go the bath-
,,22
room.
Besides tomboyishness and standing to urinate, other warning signs
developed as the child matured, and these did not appear contempora-
neously in the medical literature. Starting from the age of twelve, Joan
was given estrogens to stimulate breast growth, widening of hips and
other features of typical female pubertal development. These changes
were not welcome and Joan was openly showing signs of rejecting her
female assignment.2' The local psychiatrists attending to the child indi-
cated their belief that Joan was a definite tomboy and expressed doubt
she would develop into an acceptable and content female.2 ' Although
Money followed Joan until this point and after, these findings about the
19. See John Money, Ablatio Penis: Normal Male Infant Sex Reassignment as a Girl, 4
ARcr-vEs OF SExuAL BEHAVIOR 65 (1975) [hereinafter Money, Ablatio Penis]; see
also Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 56.
20. For example, in 1972, Money reported:
Regarding domestic activities, such as work in the kitchen and house tradition-
ally seen as part of the female's role, the mother reported that her daughter copies her
in trying to help her tidying and cleaning up the kitchen, while the boy could not
care less about it. She encourages her daughter when she helps her in the housework.
See, MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12, at 121. However, he
continued, "[tihe girl had many tomboyish traits, such as abundant physical energy, a
high level of activity, stubbornness, and being often the dominant one in a girls'
group." MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WomAN, supra note 12, at 122.
21. See Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 68.
22. See MONEY & EHRARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12, at 122. The mother noted
times when the girl had "penis envy" on seeing her twin brother's penis in the bath.
See MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12, at 121.
23. A BBC documentary in 1980 suggested that treatment in the twins case was not
developing as successfully as earlier reports indicated. See Milton Diamond, Sexual
Identit, Monozygotic Twins Reared in Discordant Sex Roles and a BBC Follow-up, 11
ARCH. SExuAL BEHAv. 181, 183 (1982) [hereinafter Diamond, BBC Follow-tp]
(describing and citing P. Williams & M. Smith, Open Secret: The First Question
(Science Series, BBC Television Production 1980)).
24. See Diamond, BBC Follow-up, supra note 23, at 183.
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child were not reported and Joan was seemingly "lost to follow-up." 25 In
actuality, due to the discord Joan felt about the counseling she was re-
ceiving in Baltimore, at the age of nine she began to object to returning.
Parental "bribes" were used to induce her to return for periodic check-
ups. In a dramatic gesture of displeasure and defiance, she ran away
from the hospital at age thirteen and was found hiding on the roof of a
nearby building.26 Joan thereafter refused to return to The Johns Hop-
kins Hospital.27
Although the case had been widely reported and cited in the medi-
cal literature, 8 the rejection of the assigned gender that the child
exhibited did not appear in the literature 21 when it might have had an
impact on the developing standard of care." Instead the significance of
the early reports of J/J's supposedly successful sex change confirmed the
apparent efficacy of this treatment as a "standard of care" for certain
infants and contributed to its wide acceptance. Skepticism regarding
its theoretical scientific base 2 prompted one critic's prolonged search to
25. Colapinto writes that Money did have further contact with the twins but this was not
reported upon. See CoLAPINTo, As NATURE MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 154-55.
26. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 8 at 300; CoAPINTo, As
NATURE MADE HiM, supra note 8, at 71.
27. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300.
28. See infra note 81.
29. See CoLApiNTo, As NATURE MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 199-204. More remarka-
bly, it now appears that prior to the J/J reports in the 1970s, available data suggested
that intersex individuals left to develop without surgery generally made satisfactory
adjustments. Significantly, these data gathered in the 1950s by John Money went un-
reported in the professional literature. Had they been reported it most likely would
have mitigated against the adopted surgical method of treatment. See CoIApINTO, As
NATURE MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 233-35.
30. After the widely publicized report on the J/J case by Diamond and Sigmundson in
1997, Money, in 1998, acknowledged the failure of treatment but theorized that
other variables including surgical delay may have caused the child to reject the as-
signed gender. See JOHN MONEY, SIN, SCIENCE, AND THE SEX POLCE: ESSAYS ON
SEXOLOGY AND SExosoPHY 314-19 (1998) [hereinafter MONEY, SEX POLICE]. Co-
lapinto reported that in 1975 Money knew that Joan had sexual fantasies about girls,
her father reported that Money asked him "how they felt about raising a lesbian," yet
this "clinical finding was not in his next report on the twins which appeared in
1975." Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 70. While continuing to ac-
knowledge tomboyish play, Money stated "[h]er behavior is... that of an active little
girl, and so dearly different by contrast from the boyish ways of her twin brother."
Money, Ablatio Penis, supra note 19, at 71.
31. See infr note 81.
32. Diamond had challenged Money's theories since the 1960s, but Money was not be
dissuaded by critics. See MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12, at
154 (citing and criticizing works of Diamond and others who challenged the correct-
ness of early surgical intervention). Money continues to defend his work. See MONEY,
2000]
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find the adult J/J to see how she had actually developed and matured.3
In 1994 both J/J and Dr. H. Keith Sigmundson, the psychiatrist in
charge of J/J's "local" care, were located and the child's life was reintro-
duced to the professional literature in 1997.34
Suffice to say, the outcome was not as reported or predicted. At the
time the twin was located again, he was a married man, the father of
three adopted children. Moreover, his true childhood experiences were
not as positive as had been first reported.35
Family members recollected that J/J, while yet quite young, showed
extreme male-like behavior and rejection of femaleness. Joan refused
"girl" toys, had little interest in girl activities and refused to wear
dresses. She preferred to "play army" and often stole her brother's trucks
and other toys to play with. In her prepubescent years, Joan "thought
[she] was a freak or something" and eventually "figured [she] was a guy"
but "didn't want to wind up opening a can of worms." 6 She was con-
stantly teased at school because of her "boy looks and her girl clothes"
and "contemplated suicide."3 7 "At age 14 years, she was caught standing
to urinate in the girls' bathroom so often that the other girls refused to
allow her entrance.... Joan would also sometimes go to the boy's
lavatory to urinate." " Throughout all of these years, despite. all of the
medical and psychiatric contact Joan endured, and despite expressing
"strong fears that something [had] been done to her genital organs," no
SEx POLICE, supra note 30, at 314-23 (responding to critics, including Milton Dia-
mond); see also FAUSTO-STERUNG, supra note 11, at 69-71.
33. In 1994, co-author of this article, Milton Diamond, located the twin with the assis-
tance of H. Keith Sigmundson, a psychiatrist with the Ministry of Health in
Victoria, British Columbia, who had treated J/J under Money's supervision. It took
Diamond some dozen years to locate and contact Sigmundson.
34. Although initially reluctant to cooperate with Diamond in following up this case,
Sigmundson was finally convinced that to do so was in the greatest interest of medi-
cine. Sigmundson confesses that he knew of Diamond's persistent attempts at
contacting him, "but I couldn't bring myself to answer." Colapinto, The True Story,
supra note 11, at 92. He admitted to being "shit-scared of John Money.... He was
the big guy. The guru. I didn't know what it would do to my career." Colapinto, The
True Story, supra note 11, at 92. J/J now a married man, agreed at Sigmundson's and
Diamond's urging to cooperate after he learned of his textbook fame "as a success,"
in his own effort to stop this form of treatment on others. See Colapinto, The True
Story, supra note 11, at 94.
35. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300; Colapinto,
The True Story, supra note 11, at 92.
36. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 299-300.
37. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300.
38. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300.
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one told her the nature of her condition." Indeed, they were advised not
to do so.4
After years of "fruitlessly trying to implement Dr. Money's plan,"
the local psychiatric team had a change of heart.41 They had noticed
Joan's preference for boy's activities and refusal to accept female status,
including her contemplation of suicide, so they had already discussed
among themselves the possibility of accepting Joan's change back to
male. They knew doing so would be against the accepted standard of
care within the medical community.42
Joan's turning point occurred at the age of 14, when she, on her
own initiative, began living as a boy, John. John recalls how soon there-
after he finally learned the truth: "In a tearful episode following John's
prodding, his father told him of the history of what had transpired
when he was an infant and why. John recalls: 'All of a sudden every-
thing clicked. For the first time things made sense and I understood
who and what I was.' ,
43
Ultimately, John underwent mastectomies to remove the estrogen-
induced breast growth and requested phalloplasty to construct a penis.
The orchiectomy (removal of the testicles) in infancy necessitated life-
long male hormone replacement.44 Following the transition, John's life
dramatically changed although social problems continued:
After the surgical procedures [female to male sex re-
reassignment surgery], John adjusted well. As a boy he was
relatively well accepted and popular with boys and girls. At 16
years, to attract girls, John obtained a windowless van with a
bed and bar.... When occasions for sexual encounters arose,
however, he was reluctant to move erotically. When he told 1
girlfriend why he was hesitant, that he was insecure about his
penis, she gossiped at school and this hurt John very much.
Nevertheless, his peers quickly rallied around him and he was
accepted and the girl rejected.45
39. Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 70.
40. See Coiimrro, As NATruR MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 56.
41. Colapinto, The Tne Story, supra note 11, at 72.
42. See CoiAiNTro, As NA'ru.a MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 178-79.
43. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300.
44. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 302. The testicles
are the prime source of androgens (male hormones). These substances are needed for
normal male development and every-day processes.
45. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 300.
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John later married a woman and adopted her three children. He
has bonded with them as a father.16 "Coitus is occasional with his wife.
They mostly pleasure each other with a great deal of physical affection
and mutual masturbation. John can have coital orgasm with ejacula-
tion.
,47
Notwithstanding John's present level of social acceptance and suc-
cess as a male, he is bitter and angry over his treatment and his lost
childhood. These dramatic and significant events in John's adolescent
and adult life, were not entered into the professional literature and thus
did not counter the positive reports of the case nor impact the standard
of care as it had developed since the 1960s, until the Diamond and
Sigmundson publication in 1997."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SURGICAL STANDARD OF CARE
Using the situations attendant to the treatment of genital trauma
or ambiguities as a model, the following sections explore how standard
medical practice sometimes develops from case reports, word-of-mouth
and the gradual clinical acceptance of innovative therapy without true
scientific scrutiny of its effectiveness. The article then describes how the
surgical standard for treatment of these cases moved from innovation to
standard practice. Although the long-term results of J/Js surgery would
not be known for many years, surgery became accepted treatment as the
case was recounted in the literature. The article next explores how
medical standards of practice are judged by the law and questions the
premises surrounding traditional judicial deference to medical standards
of care.
A. Standards Of Care Within The Medical Community
Medical standards of care are always evolving; they are often nei-
ther static nor clearly delineated. 9 Because medical science is
46. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 302.
47. Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 301, explaining that
while J/J's testicles were removed, he still retains his accessory reproductive glands-
Cowper's gland, prostate and seminal vesicles-and these, more than sperm, contrib-
ute the bulk of semen).
48. See generally Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11.
49. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Mal-
practice Litigation, 54 LAw & CoNrEMp. PROBS. 119, 126-29 (1991).
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,evolutionary, patients do not receive uniform care. For example, some
medical treatment involves experimentation. Medical experimentation
typically means that physicians treat patients according to a protocol
designed to test an hypothesis and to contribute to the body of medical
knowledge. 0 Medical practice, on the other hand, involves treatment by
accepted therapies, typically considered "interventions that are designed
solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client and
that have a reasonable expectation of success."5"
Innovative therapy is neither experimental nor standard practice; it
involves treatment that is "'designed solely to enhance the well-being of
an individual patient or client' but ha[s] not been tested sufficiently to
meet the standard of having 'a reasonable expectation of success.,52
Because innovative therapies are not sufficiently tested, "the potential
benefits and risks of innovative therapies are less well known or
predictable."" Thus, innovative therapies, while formulated with the
best interests of the patient in mind, nevertheless expose patients to "a
greater likelihood that the balance of benefits and risks may be
unfavorable due either to the therapies being ineffective or entailing
greater, possibly unknown risks."' 4 In order to minimize the number of
patients exposed to the attendant unknown risks of innovative therapy,
"[r] adically new procedures ... should... be made the object of formal
research at an early stage in order to determine whether they are safe
and effective.""
50. See NATIONAL COMMlISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF Bio-
MEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 3
(1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]. The Belmont Report remains a cornerstone
of the National Institutes of Health's guidelines of human subject research; cf PRO-
TECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK
xxi-xxiii & Appendix 6 (DHHS 1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS].
51. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.
52. Dale H. Cowan, Innovative Therapy Versus Experimentation, 21 TORT & INS. L.J.
619, 621 (1986) (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS:
RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 77-0004, 1977)). See also
BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw 5 6-5, at 386 (1995) (discussing medical inno-
vation); Dieter Giesen, Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and
Experimentation: A Comparative Examination, 3 MED. L. REv. 22 (1995).
53. Cowan, supra note 52, at 621; see also Giesen, supra note 52, at 33.
54. Cowan, supra note 52, at 621-22.
55. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 50, at 3; see also Giesen, supra note 52, at 33. When
experimentation follows innovation, institutional review boards provide an early air-
ing and review of ethical issues. No such review occurs when innovative therapy
becomes standard in an ad hoc fashion.
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Unfortunately, scientific assessment of innovative surgical proce-
dures is not the norm within the practice of medicine.56 "[M]ost
innovations have become accepted as 'standard procedures' without ever
having been subjected to the rigorous testing for efficacy of a
[randomized controlled trial]." 57 "[I1f rigorous assessment [of medical
56. Others have noted this phenomenon with regard to medical practices that become
standard before validation. For instance, David H. Spodick, The Surgical Mystique
and the Double Standard, 85 AMERICAN HEART JOURNAL 579-83 (1973), found, after
reviewing 70 reports in specialty journals appearing in 1971, only 9 of 16 medical
treatment studies were controlled; none of 49 studies of surgical intervention in-
volved a controlled study. Consider the following comment:
There follows a period during which the innovation (having received pro-
fessional and public support and legitimation through state endorsement
and third-party coverage) achieves the privileged status of a "standard pro-
cedure." For a period of time it becomes generally accepted by interested
parties as the most appropriate way of proceeding with a particular prob-
lem or situation. It is probably incorrect to refer here to the activity as an
"innovation" ... since at this stage it has graduated from being just an-
other promising performance (something new with great potential) to the
position of being an established and respected activity. Although there is a
bias against reporting unsuccessful or untoward performances, they cer-
tainly occur but are usually dismissed as infrequent, the result of having
poor material to work with, public misunderstanding, and so forth. So en-
trenched has the activity become that it takes rare courage for any
individual or group even to question its effectiveness or desirability. To do
so, as we shall see, is to invite retaliation from professional organization
interests, public indignation, and even in rare cases sanctions from the
state.
John B. McKinlay, From "Promising Report" to "Standard Procedure " Seven Stages in
the Career of a Medical Innovation, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 374, 387-88
(1981); see also Margaret Lent, Note, The Medical and Legal Risks of the Electronic
Fetal Monitor, 51 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1999). Lent explains that fetal monitoring to
avoid hypoxia during delivery became standard care in the 1970s before scientific
validation of its efficacy. Over the years, use has expanded beyond high risk deliveries
so that this technique is now used for 83% of all American births. See Lent, supra, at
812. Now, in twelve randomized control studies, with one exception, none suggest
that electronic fetal monitoring decreases fetal mortality. See Lent, supra, at 813.
Moreover, in one study, the fetal monitored group actually suffered an increase in
neurological disorders. See Lent, supra, at 814. In sum, overwhelming scientific evi-
dence disputes its efficacy. See Lent, supra, at 814-15. Nevertheless, routine fetal
monitoring with its attendant increased cost in time and effort remains an en-
trenched practice in delivery, perhaps out of fear of legal liability for abandoning an
established standard, see Lent, supra, at 822-23, or "professional inertia." See Lent,
supra, at 808.
57. Nancy M.P. King & Gail Henderson, Treatments of Last Resort: Informed Consent and
the Diffision of New Technology, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1007, 1021 (1991); see also
David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The UncriticalAcceptance ofMedical Innovation,
269 JAMA 3030, 3030 (1993) ("The need for ongoing assessment of both new and
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innovations] occurs, it takes place quite late in the 'career' of an innova-
tion, after it has been reported anecdotally, adopted by professionals,
medical organizations, public advocates, and third party payers, and
accepted as 'standard practice."' 58 Commentators note that physicians
often display a premature eagerness to adopt innovative therapy before
adequate studies are conducted.59 In fact, few medical practices have
been subjected to randomized clinical trials.60 Instead, medical standards
often develop in an ad hoc fashion, as physicians try new technicIues and
share early reports of their experiences among their colleagues. Thus,
innovative therapy often crosses over to standard therapy through in-
formal acceptance rather than validation and acceptance. Thereafter,
clinicians become entrenched in following particular therapies, and be-
come resistant to adopting superior therapies.62 Significantly, critics note
that there also tends to be reluctance toward publishing reports of un-
successful procedures or treatments.3
old medical technologies is undisputed. Nevertheless, much, if not most, of contem-
porary medical practice still lacks a scientific foundation."); Robert L. Kane & Judith
Garrard, Changing Physician Prescribing Practices, 271 JAMA 393 (1994).
58. King & Henderson, supra note 57, at 1013; see also McKinlay, supra note 56, at 376.
59. See McKinlay, supra note 56, at 381; see also Donald E. Kacmar, The Impact of Com-
puterized Medical Literature Databases on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Time for
Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up Call?, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 617 (1997)
60. See King & Henderson, supra note 57, at 1021 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AssESSMENT, THE IMPACT OF RANDOMIZED CLINICAL TRIALS ON HEALTH PoLIcY
AND MEDICAL PRACTICE: BACKGROUND PAPER, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(estimating fewer than ten to twenty percent); Grimes, supra note 57, at 3030-32
(arguing many contemporary medical practices still lack a scientific foundation); see
also Lent, supra note 56, at 811-13.
61. See Grimes, supra note 57, at 3031-32; Kacmar, supra note 59, at 642 (commenting
"doctors tend to look to informal information sources, such as other colleagues, for
answers in lieu of looking outside their own medical circles for new studies, data, or
procedures"); King & Henderson, supra note 56, at 1023 (identifying this phenome-
non as part of the conceptual conflict "Is medicine essentially science or essentially
treatment?"); McKinlay, supra note 56, at 376. See generally DAVID L. SACKETr ET
Al.., EVIDENcE-BASED MEDICINE: How To PRACTICE & TEACH EBM 5-9 (1997)
(describing deficiencies in clinical practice).
62. See Kacmar, supra note 59, at 631-32; Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Man-
agement of Intersex: A Shifting Paradigm, 9 J. CIuN. Em~ics 360, 367 (1998)
(commenting, "As with many clinical paradigm shifts, in the absence of data, adher-
ents of each protocol become increasingly dogmatic that their preferred approach is
better for the patient, and that it would be unethical to subject the patient to the
other 'less acceptable' treatment. Individual dinicians' attachment to specific treat-
ment regimes result in the ongoing polarization of paradigms.").
63. See Grimes, supra note 57, at 3031 (commenting on resistance to change, "let sleep-
ing dogmas lie"); McKinley, supra note 56, at 379.
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B. The Surgical Standard in Treatment ofAmbiguous Genitalia
Since innovative therapy often becomes standard therapy through
informal acceptance and common use,6' it should come as no surprise
that the practice of recommending early surgical intervention in cases of
genital ambiguity became standard prior to rigorous study of treatment
outcomes. 6' The treatment, first promulgated by Money, was based on a
nurture theory of development supposedly derived from his analysis of
clinical cases of intersexed individuals rather than from experimental
investigation. It essentially began when his reports, based on studies of
hermaphrodites, implied that it made no difference if such intersexed
children were raised as either boys or girls; they would equally adapt to
either gender assignment.66 The only caveats Money expressed regarding
sex reassignment were that it be done as early as possible (preferably
before the 18th to 24th months of life), that no ambiguity be allowed in
the gender of the child's upbringing and that the infants' genitalia be
reconstructed to match the gender of assignment.67 Money's theory es-
sentialy held that children raised as boys will develop as such and those
raised as girls will so develop. Since it would be easier to surgically repair
the genitals with female-like anatomy, that should be the preferred
method of management.68
64. See SAcKEr-, supra note 61, at 5-9.
65. The kinds of surgeries performed on infants with genital anomalies are numerous.
Sex reassignment is the most radical, but other surgeries also have erotic and repro-
ductive ramifications. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 40-64 (discussing surgical
interventions); MONEY, SFx ERuoas 1994, supra note 17, at 52-55 (discussing surgi-
cal interventions); Diamond & Sigmundson, Management oflntersexualiy, supra note
11, at 1047-48 (discussing nonsurgical options).
66. See supra note 7.
67. See MONEY, MAN & WomAN, supra note 12, at 152-53, 176, 179; see aso KESSLER,
supra note 12, at 14-15; ANNE FAUsTo-STERUNG, supra note 11, at 45-46, 63. In a
1998 book, Money contends that other researchers early on misstated his contention
that sex could be changed up until the age of two; that he had always asserted that
"the crucial age is somewhere around eighteen months." MONEY, SEX PoLIcE, supra
note 30, at 313. However, he was less dear in his original writings, "the critical pe-
riod is reached by about the age of eighteen months. By the age of two and one-half
years, gender role is already well established." MONEY, SEx POLICE, supra note 30, at
312 (quoting his work from 1955). He now contends that JIJ's disastrous outcome
could be the result of parental delay in surgery until 22 months (among other possi-
bilities). MONEY, SEx POLICE, supra note 30, at 319. Money also notes that JIJ's
"social reassignment" had occurred at seventeen months. MONEY, SEx PoLIcE, supra
note 30, at 315.
68. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 29 (noting that it is easier to surgically construct a
"functional" vagina than a penis).
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The initial reports of the J/J case,69 particularly as reported in the
1972 book Man & Woman, Boy & Girl,70 and the treatment's purported
success spread rapidly and were frequently recounted in the professional
literature.71 The theory that an infant's sex could be successfully reas-
signed thus profoundly influenced the standard of care for infants born
with ambiguous genitalia or a micropenis and those whose penis was
lost through trauma or accidental amputation.72
Cases of infants born with ambiguous genitalia are not common
but neither are they rare. 73 Of the 3 to 4 million children born annually
in the United States, approximately 1 in 2000 are born with ambiguous
external 4genitalia (thus approximately 1,500 to 2,000 such children
yearly).7 An estimated 100-200 pediatric surgical sex reassignments are
performed in the United States annually.
As the J/J case originally disseminated into literature, the prevailing
treatment view became that when amputation or birth defects result in
ambiguous genitalia, or genitalia are seemingly incompatible with male
69. Although some sex reassignment surgery had occurred previously, the J/J case might
be considered the "ground zero" case for justifying this standard of care.
70. MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12.
71. See, e.g., KESSLER, supra note 12, at 6-7, 13-14:
According to all of the specialists interviewed, management of intersexed
cases is based upon the theory of gender proposed first by John Money,
J.G. Hampson, and J.L. Hampson in 1955 and developed in 1972 by
Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt that "gender identity is changeable until ap-
proximately eighteen months of age.
72. See generally ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL IN-
VENTION OF SEX 181-82 (1998); KESSLER, supra note 12, at 6; Dreger, supra note
12, at 27.
73. Traumatic injury, especially to male infants, although less common than intersex
births, occurs with sufficient frequency to appear in the literature as well. See supra
note 13.
74. No definitive statistics exist. Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at
401 (citing estimates of one in 2000; Dreger, supra note 12, at 26, reports of esti-
mates of 1 in 500, 1 in 1,500, and an even larger group of children with
"cosmetically 'unacceptable' genitalia" possibly subjected to repair in infancy. Kessler
notes and discusses the difficulty in determining the number of infants with intersex
conditions and genitalia anomalies. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 135 n. 4. Fausto-
Sterling has recently estimated 1.7 in 100 births are intersex, by reviewing literature
reporting incidence by category. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 51-52.
JlJ's unusual case of genital trauma is also not alone in medical literature. In an-
other case study not lost to follow-up, a child lost his penis through trauma. The
child underwent sex reassignment but "in adolescence the patient refused to continue
hormonal medication and requested sex reassignment as a boy." Ochoa, supra note
13, at 1116. See also Geoffrey Cowley, Gender Limbo, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1997, at
64 (reporting biographies and discussing changing standard of care).
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sexual functioning (standing to urinate as a child and adolescent and
inserting a penis into a vagina as an adult), such males were better off
undergoing sex reassignment to assure satisfactory adult sexual function
as a female. 5 Incorporating the theory that individuals are psychosexu-
ally neutral and would accept their gender of rearing, this proposal
offered a relatively simple solution to what was seen as a difficult situa-
tion.76 This view came to dominate pediatric and social science
literature.77 Since then medical wisdom in these cases has remained
largely based on hypothetical "surgical potentials" rather than on data
from studies or even the long-term outcome of these surgeries. 7 Im-
portandy, those recommending a surgical standard have not been
entirely clear whether childhood acceptance or adult comfort with gen-
der is a paramount goal.79
Surgical intervention became standard practice to the extent that,
as recently as 1996, the American Academy of Pediatrics published
these guidelines:
75. Dreger explains why males were surgically turned into females whereas females were
left as females:
[Cilinicians treating intersex children often talk about vaginas in these
children as the absence of a thing, as a space, a "hole," a place to put
something. That is precisely why opinion holds that "a functional vagina
can be constructed in virtually everyone"-because it is relatively easy to
construct an insensitive hole surgically. "
Dreger, supra note 12, at 29; see also Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, su-
pra note 11, at 298 (citing medical literature). While there was no evidence that the
constructed female genitalia would be a better substitute, the simplistic thinking at
that time, was that to be a satisfactory sexually functioning woman meant only to
have a female appearing pudenda and a vagina suitable to accept a penis.
76. See Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 362-63 (describing the treatment protocol of
early surgery).
77. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 136 n. 10; KING, supra note 12, at 369-70 (reporting
prevailing view, "Up to approximately 18 months of age, sexual identity is not estab-
lished and gender reassignment may be well tolerated by the child"); Diamond &
Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 12, at 298 (citing medical texts); Kitz-
inger, supra note 15. See e.g., Donahoe, supra note 12, at 527; Timing of Elective
Surgery, supra note 12; Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 689-90 (reporting on prevail-
ing view to reassign gender in cases of micropenis of less than 2 cm).
78. KESSLER, supra note 12, 12-15 n.10, 14; Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment,
supra note 11, at 298; Dreger, supra note 12, at 27; Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62,
at 367. See also Diamond & Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality, supra note
11, at 1025 (calling for review of sex reassignments done over the past decades).
79. See Milton Diamond, Intersexuality: Recommendations for Management, 27 ARCHrvas
SExuAL BEHAVIOR 634, 638 (1998).
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Research on children with ambiguous genitalia has shown that
sexual identity is a function of social learning through differ-
ential responses of multiple individuals in the environment.
For example, children whose genetic sexes are not clearly re-
flected in external genitalia (i.e., hermaphroditism) can be
raised successfully as members of either sex if the process be-
gins before the age of 2 1/2 years. Therefore, a person's sexual
body image is largely a function of socialization. 0
Remarkably, the only references to support this proposition were to
the decade-old or older works of John Money; no other corroborating
work was cited."
Not all neonatal surgical interventions for infants born with am-
biguous genitalia involve sex reassignment. The surgical alteration of
80. Timing of Elective Surgery, supra note 12, at 590 (supporting this proposition with
works authored or co-authored by Money and dating between 1957 and 1987: John
Money et al., Imprinting and the Establishment of Gender Role, 77 AscH. NEUROL.
PSYCH. 333- 336 (1957)); MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN .AND WOMAN, supra note 12;
John Money & B.F. Norman, Gender Identity and Gender Transposition: Longitudinal
Outcome Study of 24 Male Hermaphrodites Assigned As Boys, 13 J. SEx MARITA.
THERaPY 75-92 (1987)).
81. Suzanne Kessler has written of Money's dominance in the field:
Almost all of the published literature on intersexed infant case manage-
ment has been written or cowritten by one researcher, John Money ....
Even the publications that are produced independently of Money reference
him and reiterate his management philosophy... Even though psycholo-
gists fiercely argue issues of gender identity and gender role development,
doctors who treat intersexed infants seem untouched by these debates ....
Why Money has been so single-handedly influential in promoting his ideas
about gender is a question worthy of a separate substantial analysis.
KEsSLER, supra note 12, at 136 n. 10; see also DREGER, supra note 72, at 181-82
(describing dominance of Money in developing the standards of care for intersex in-
fants); FAusTO-STERLANG, supra note 11, at 67-68; Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex
Reassignment, supra note 8, at 298 (describing Moneys dominance); Kitzinger, supra
note 15, at 1 (discussing Money's dominance).
Money's views have changed somewhat, although he generally still approves sex
reassignment even in cases of traumatic amputation of the penis. See MONEY, SEx
EiutoRs 1994, supra note 17, at 84 (writing of total loss of penis: "All in all, it is a
difficult situation, regardless of the sex of rearing[,]" and on reassignment generally:
"the most expeditious rule to follow is that no child, after the toddler age, should
have a sex reassignment imposed on the basis of a [physician imposed] dogmatically
held principle.").
82. See William Reiner, Sex Assignment in the Neonate With Intersex or Inadequate Geni-
talia, AM. J. OF DIsEAsEs OF CHILDREN 1044, Oct. 1999, at *2 available in WL
Database AMA-JNLS [hereinafter Reiner, Sex Assignment] (discussing problem that
children will reject the sex of rearing and commenting "surgical reduction of anen-
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any female born with a clitoris larger than one centimeter is also rec-
ommended.83 In keeping with the psychosexual neutrality-at-birth
theory which says acceptance of the gender of rearing is contingent on
having gender congruent genitalia, an enlarged clitoris was seen as
needing reduction or removal to prevent psychosexual ambiguity and to
promote parental bonding and affection. Importantly, the efficacy of
even these more modest surgical interventions to normalize genitalia has
not been assessed by long-term study, and for similar reasons these in-
terventions deserve the same scrutiny as sex reassignment.85
larged [sic] clitoris can at times damage sensation and thus reduce orgasmic potential
and genital pleasure and, like ablation of the testes, is irreversible."); Dreger, supra
note 12, at 28.
83. See e.g., Ian A. Aaronson, Sexual Differentiation and Intersexuality, in CLINICAL PEDI-
ATRIC UROLOGY 977, 1005, 1007 (P. Kelalis et al. eds., 1992); KESSLER, supra note
12, at 43; Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of lntersexuaiy: From the Age of Gonads
to the Age of Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 349 (1998) [hereinafter Dreger,
History](commenting on standard care for clitoral surgery, "If her clitoris is longer
than 1 centimeter stretched at birth, surgeons will seek to surgically reduce it because
they think it will bother the child's parents and interfere with bonding and gender
identity formation.").
84. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 52-64; Sherri A. Groveman, The Hanukkah Bush:
Ethical Implications in the Clinical Management oflntersex, 9 J. CLmCAL ETHICS 356,
357-59 (1998); Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 363; Nussbaum, supra note 12,
at 93; see also MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, supra note 12, at 152; MONEY,
Sx ERRORS 1994, supra note 17, at 82-83. There is no evidence that parents of chil-
dren born with physical handicaps are any less bonded or otherwise protective or
loving to their children. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 91-94. Kessler, on the other
hand, presents cases where the parents accept the intersex condition if it is presented
well or have severe misgivings for giving in to the physicians' urging for surgery. See
KESSLER, supra note 12, at 91-94. There also are studies that show that children
might be aware of the appearance of their own or peers' genitals but don't consider
them crucial for classification of gender until about the age of 9. See RONALD GOLD-
MAN & JULIETTE GOLDMAN, CHILDREN's SEXUAL THINKING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF CHILDREN AGED 5 To 15 YEARs IN AUSTRALIA, NORTH AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND
SWEDEN 192-215, 385 (1982).
85. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1046-
1049; Dreger, supra note 12, at 32 (noting a lack of long-term follow-up on females
undergoing clitoral surgery); Reiner, Sex Assignment, supra note 82; Cowley, supra
note 74, at 66 (reporting on study of female pseudohermaphrodites (genetic females
born with masculinized external sex organs) wherein five of twelve surgically reduced
clitorises "had withered and died" as a result of surgical intervention). Annie Green,
writes: "Thirty-two years have passed since my clitoris was taken from me. Though I
was too young to be able now to recall the event, I feel that I will be grieving the loss
for the rest of my life." Annie Green, My Beautifid Clitoris, CHRYSALIS, Fall
1997/Winter 1998, at 12. Cheryl Chase, an advocate for the intersexed, warns that
better clitoral surgery is not the proper response to an enlarged phallus. See Cheryl
Chase, Surgical Progress Is Not the Answer to Intersexuality, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 385,
386-87 (1998) [hereinafter Chase, Surgical Progress]. Physicians practicing today ac-
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Unfortunately, like the practice of female genital alteration
("maitilation") for cultural reasons," these surgical interventions can
reduce or destroy the girl's potential for sexual satisfaction in adulthood
and limit later surgical alternatives should the male gender prefefence
manifest itself at adolescence.8 7 Interestingly, the effect of the 1996
Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act,88  on medical
treatment of infant females with enlarged clitoridies is unknown. While
Congress intended the act to curb the cultural practices of "members
of certain cultural and religious groups within the United
States,"89 it broadly bars circumcision, excision and infibulation of "the
knowledge that the techniques of clitoral surgery from just a decade ago yielded poor
results. The comments of Associate Professor of Urology and Pediatrics Laurence
Baskin in response to a visit by ISNA members to the University of California, San
Francisco medical school are revealing- "Baskin admits that surgical technique in the
past was not optimal. 'The surgery was done... by very well intended physicians,
but we didn't understand the nerve supply well. We started to understand the nerve
supply [to the clitoris] 10 years ago."' Althaea Yronwode, Intersex Individuals Dispute
Wisdom of Surgery on Infants, SYNAPSE, Mar. 11, 1999, available at <http://
itsa.ucsf.edu/-synapselarchiveslmarl 1.99/yronwode.html>.
Although more cautious in light of the J/J case, Kenneth Glassberg continues to
perform surgery, including female gender reassignment and clitoral surgery. See Ken-
neth Glassberg, Editorial. Gender Assignment and the Pediatric Urologist, 161 J.
UROLOGY 1308, 1308-09 (1999); see also Kenneth Glassberg, The Intersex Infant:
Early Gender Assignment and Surgical Reconstruction, 11 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT
GYNECOLOGY 151, 153 (1998).
86. See generally Joleen C. Lenihan, A Physician's Dilemma, Legal Ramifications of an
Unorthodox Surgery, 35 SANTA CIAA L. Rav. 953 (1995); Joanne A. Liu, When Law
and Culture Clash: Female Genital Mutilation, A Traditional Practice Gaining Recog-
nition as a Global Concern, 11 N.Y. INT'L. L. REv. 71 (1998). Both Kessler and
Dreger liken the surgical treatment of ambiguous genitalia for cosmetic and cultural
reasons to female genital mutilation. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 80-83; Dreger,
supra note 12, at 33-34.
87. See Chase, Surgical Progress, supra note 85, at 386; Milton Diamond, Pediatric Man-
agement ofAmbiguous Genitalia and Traumatized Genitalia, 162 J. UROLOGY 1021,
1024 (1999) [hereinafter Diamond, Pediatric Management]; Kipnis & Diamond, Pe-
diatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 402-03. Meyer-Bahlburg has written:
Some female-assigned patients with a history of clitoromegaly will end up
changing their gender to male, and in those cases, a history of ditorectomy
or clitoral resection with the reduction loss of a penile organ altogether
causes great regret. In my clinical experience, also some patients who live as
lesbian women would prefer if their enlarged clitoris had been left intact.
Heino F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg, Gender Assignment in Intersexuality, 10(2) J. PSYCH. &
HUMAN SaxuArTTy 12 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
88. See Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. III
1998).
89. Congressional Findings, Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 645(a)(1), 110 Star. 3009-708 (1997).
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whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of an-
other person who has not attained the age of 18 years"9° unless it is
"necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed."9 It
remains to be seen whether a court might view surgical treatment to
achieve normally-appearing female genitalia as necessary to the health of
infants.92
Although surgical intervention became "standard care" for intersex
infants, rather than considering it a proven treatment protocol, it would
have been more appropriate to characterize it as "innovative" therapy all
along, because the treatments have not been adequately grounded in
long-term studies.93 To this day, the recommended surgical manage-
ment practices for ambiguous genitalia that have been promoted by the
American Academy of Pediatrics, 94 remain unsupported by long-term
study.95 The appropriateness of early surgical intervention was never
90. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (a) (Supp. III 1998).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (b)(1) (Supp. III 1998). See KEssLER, supra note 12, at 81-82
(commenting on ISNA position that the language is sufficiently broad to cover some
intersex surgeries); Dreger, supra note 12, at 34. Some suggest that the act violates
equal protection law because it protects females but not males from the customary
practice of circumcision. See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the LegalAuthority to
Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Chil-
dren?: The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y 87, 119-22 (1999).
92. Several rulings against genital cosmetic infant surgery have been issued in Bogata,
Colombia. In 1999, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, its high court, issued two
precedential decisions barring intersex surgery. These cases involved reducing the size
of the clitoris and vaginoplasry. Prior to deciding the cases, the court sought com-
ments from the Intersex Society of North America and others, including John Money
and Milton Diamond. The court ruled the surgery cosmetic and unnecessary and
held that surgical intervention should be postponed until the child is able to consent.
Moreover, it ruled that intersex individuals are a protected minority. (SU-337/99,
May 12 1999 and T-551/99, Aug 2, 1999). In 1995, the Colombia high court
barred sex reassignment of a young male who had lost his penis in a traumatic acci-
dent (T-477/95). The cases are summarized at <http://www.isna.org/colombia/>.
93. For elaboration on the distinctions between innovation, practice and experimenta-
tion, see THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 50, at 3; Cowen, supra note 52; King &
Henderson, supra note 57; Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Sub-
ject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 165-68 (1998).
94. See Timing ofElective Surgery, supra note 12.
95. See Cowley, supra note 74, at 66 (noting scarcity of both medical and psychological
studies); Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at 1026; Diamond & Sig-
mundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 8, at 303 (noting lack of validating studies
and need for long-term follow-up); Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note
11, at 406; Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 99; Ochoa, supra note 13, at 1119 (calling
for more study); William Reiner, To Be Male or Female-That is the Question, 151
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC MEDICINE 224, 224 (1997) [hereinafter Reiner, To Be Male
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well supported by scientific investigation, and, in fact, some of the re-
cent research refutes its efficacy. 96 While J/J's case may have initially
suggested a positive outcome was possible, the true test of the treat-
ment's success could not be known until the patient reached
adulthood.
7
Since the latest reports on J/J's case were revealed in 1997, the
medical community has itself divided on this issue. 8 Critics of the tra-
ditional standard of care challenge the premises that purportedly
supported surgical intervention. First, they argue that there is no estab-
lished body of evidence that normal infants are born sexually neutral.
The original beliefs were predicated on reports of hermaphrodites, not
average males and females.99 These reports were issued by a single inves-
tigator.0° In particular, critics note that the last decade has produced
genetic, neurological and biological studies that support a premise that
or Female] (calling for more research and cautioning, "It may well be that conclusions
about sex reassignment as described in much of the literature are erroneous secondary
to the conspicuous lack of such longitudinal data and appropriate longitudinal analy-
sis."); Justine Marut Schober, A Surgeon's Response to the Intersex Controversy, 9 J.
CLIN. ETmIs 393, 394 (1998) (noting lack of long-term studies regarding psycho-
logical adjustment); Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 367; Woodhouse, supra note
12, at 692 (questioning wisdom of sex reassignment surgery in children with micro-
penis and lack of long-term study).
96. See Ochoa, suepra note 13, at 1119; William G. Reiner, Androgen Exposure in Utero
and the Development ofMale Gender Identity in Genetic Males Reassigned at Birth, pre-
sented at International Behavioral Development Symposium 2000, May 25-27,
2000 (reporting that 17 of 23 genetic males reassigned as females sponteously de-
clared male gender identity between ages 5 and 17). William George Reiner, Case
Study: Sex Reassignment in a Teenage Girl, 35 J. Am. AcAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCH. 799, 801-03 (1996) [hereinafter Reiner, Teenage Girl]; Reiner, Sex Assign-
ment, supra note 82, at *1 (noting his own studies with "18 children who are 46, XY
males with totally inadequate [sic] phalluses but normal testes, sex reassigned to fe-
male, demonstrates that parents tend to be uncomfortable with sex reassignment and
that the children do not behave as typical little girls."); Reiner, To Be Male or Female,
supra note 95, at 225; Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 692.
97. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment supra note 8, at 302 (noting "[c]ases
of infant sex reassignment require inspection and review after puberty; 5- and 10-year
postsex reassignment follow-ups are still insufficient.").
98. The medical community has become polarized on treatment issues. The Journal of
Clinical Ethic's symposium issue on intersexuality reported, "The parties in this dis-
cussion have become increasingly estranged. Alice Domurat Dreger, guest editor of
this special issue... informs us that she invited some of those who have acted as pro-
ponents of infant surgery to present their arguments, but none accepted." Edmund
G. Howe, Intersexuality: What Should Careproviders Do Now, 9 J. CLiN. ETHICS 337,
338 (1998). See also Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 367.
99. Seesupra note 7.
100. See Kitzinger, supra note 15, at 6-7, 13-14.
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humans are, in keeping with their mammalian heritage, predisposed and
biased to interact with environmental, familial and social forces in either
a male or female mode.101
Second, critics point to evidence that persons born with genitalia
that fall outside our normal expectations can achieve a satisfying psy-
chosexual adjustment without surgical intervention'0 2 and argue that the
imperative to create typical genitalia is of overrated significance.", No-
tably, recent case studies of young males suffering accidental, traumatic
loss of the penis (such as J/J's) suggest reattachment or surgical recon-
101. Wilson and Reiner note that there is "considerable support for the theory that
there may be a neurobiologic component to many gender identities" and that gen-
der may be influenced by hormone levels in the brain "prenatally or immediately
postnatally" and conclude, "[c]ertainly gender development involves more than
the behaviors of the parents in rearing the child." Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62,
at 364. See generally Milton Diamond, Biological Aspects of Sexual Orientation and
Identity, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION, BEHAVIOR AND IDENTITY: A
HANDBOOK (L. Diamant & R. McAnulty eds., 1995); DEAN HAMER & PETER
COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES: WHY THEY MA'rER MoRE THAN You
THINK (1998); Simon LeVay & Dean H. Hamer, Evidence for a Biological Influence
in Male Homosexuality, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 1994, at 44.
102. Diamond and Sigmundson explain:
Most intersex conditions can remain without any surgery at all. A woman
with a phallus can enjoy her hypertrophied clitoris and so can her partner.
Women with AIS [androgen insensitivity syndrome] or virilizing CAH
[congenital adrenal hyperplasia] who have smaller-than-usual vaginas can
be advised to use pressure dilation to fashion one to facilitate coitus; a
woman with partial AIS likewise can enjoy a large clitoris. A male with hy-
pospadias might have to sit to urinate without mishap but can function
sexually without surgery. A person with a micropenis can satisfy a partner
and father children.
Diamond & Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality, supra note 11, at 1049; see
also Dreger, supra note 12, at 29-32.
103. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 105-32; Dreger, supra note 12, at 33.
It was, unfortunately, only recently revealed that a study of more than 250 in-
tersexed individuals who received no surgical intervention as babies was conducted
prior to 1952 but left unpublished in the professional literature. The review by John
Money found: "Far from manifesting psychological traumas and mental illnesses, the
study showed, the majority of patients rose above their genital handicap and not only
made an 'adequate adjustment' to life, but lived in a way virtually indistinguishable
from people without genital difference." COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM, supra
note 11, at 233. One can only conjecture as to why this study was never mentioned
nor considered by its author after its presentation as a senior dissertation at Harvard
(available by written application to the Widener Library at Harvard University). See
CoLAsiNTO, As NATURE MADE HIM, supra note 11, at 235.
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struction of the penis will yield better psychosexual results than sex reas-
signment.
04
Third, critics point to transsexuality, a condition in which indi-
viduals develop a: sexual identity at odds with both their normal genitals
and socially- and sexually-appropriate rearing. °5 The lives and com-
ments of such individuals provide evidence that sexual identity is not
solely linked to either the physical appearance of the genitalia or the
socialization occurring in child rearing. 06 If the normal appearance of
the genitals and unequivocal rearing are determinant, then there could
be no explanation for incidences of transsexuality.
Finally, critics remind those who adhere to the surgical standard
that, "after some three decades of these surgeries, there is still not a single
report of a nonintersexual boy having been successfully raised as a contented
androphilic woman."'07
Another important new factor prompting reevaluation of the surgi-
cal standard is the emergence of criticism by former patients. Many of
the individuals who have been subjected to sex reassignment or clitoral
surgery are calling for an end to such practices.1'8 The Intersex Society
104. Ochoa, supra note 13, at 1119; see also Judson J. Van Wyk, Editorial Should boys
with micropenis be reared as girls?, 134 J. PEDIATRICs 537, 538 (1999) (noting lack of
study and stating that "micropenis by itself should not provide sufficient grounds to
justify a female gender assignment"); Bassamn Bin-Abbas et. al, Congenital hypogo-
nadotropic hypogonadism and micropenis: Effect of testosterone treatment on adult penile
size-Why sex reversal is not indicated, 134 J. PEDIATRICS 579, 582 (1999)
(concluding that there is "no clinical, physiologic, or psychologic grounds to support
the gender reversal of male infants with androgen-responsive micropenis").
105. See Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at 1022.
106. See generally W.O BOCKTING & ELI COLEMAN, GENDER DYSPHORIA: INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACHES IN CLINIcAL MANAGEMENT (1992); GENDER BLENDING (Bonnie
Bullough et al. eds, 1997); HoLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING: CONFRONTING THE
LIMITS OF DUALUTY (1989).
107. See Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at 1023. See also Reiner, To Be
Male or Female, supra note 95, at 225 (reporting on his ongoing research and stating
that he is following fifteen 46 XY children who were castrated at birth due to genital
anomalies, stating that although reared as females the patients "do not appear to be
classically male or female but display masculine characteristics that are in many cases
quite striking"). A recent article reports of one individual who was sex reassigned and,
at the age of 28, remains living as a woman. She, however, has a male-identified job
and is ambisexually oriented. She is presently living with a female sexual partner. See
Susan J. Bradley et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months, Sex Reas-
signment at 7 Months Psychosexual Follow-up in Young Adulthood, 102 PEDIATRICS 1
(1998) (full text also available at <http://www.pediatrics.orglcgi/contentlfulll
102/l/e9)>.
108. Reports of adverse outcomes have been met with ambivalence in the medical com-
munity. As psychiatrist and attorney Edmond Howe writes,
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of North America, founded in 1993 and operated by intersexuals, has
issued recommendations that call for avoiding unnecessary infant sur-
gery and postponing irreparable surgical interventions.0 They challenge
the efficacy of surgery, pointing to their own cases as evidence."0
Nevertheless, some clinicians continue to evaluate male infants for
sex reassignment based on the size or functionality of the penis and fe-
males for surgical alteration based upon clitoris size and they continue
to perform surgical procedures to alter genitalia which forecloses later
choices for patients."' So great is the fear of psychosexual maladjust-
ment,"2 proponents of surgery continue to identify phallus size as a key
More recently, surgeons have been criticized because they have not ac-
corded enough weight to patients' reports of adverse outcomes. There is a
psychological reason that careproviders may ignore reports of adverse out-
comes: if the claims are true, surgeons would have to acknowledge that
performing surgery was a mistake. This would be exceedingly painful. The
only way to avoid this pain would be to deny that these claims are true.
Howe, supra note 98, at 338; see also Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 94.
109. ISNA, Recommendations for Treatment Intersex Infants and Children,
<http://www.isna.org/recommendations.html> [hereinafter "ISNA Recommenda-
tions"]. Money reserves particularly harsh criticism for ISNA, labeling the
organization's policy as "militantly activist" in advocating raising the intersex child as
an "it," which he regards as a step backward. MONEY, SEx POLICE, sitpra note 30, at
320-21. Money misstates ISNA's position. ISNA has never advocated raising chil-
dren as "its." They advocate sexual assignment but without any surgery. See ISNA
Recommendations, supra. Diamond also advocates raising the child in a clear gender
but without cosmetic genital altering surgery. See Diamond, Pediatric Management,
supra note 87, at 1025. Kenneth Glassberg, on the other hand, argues "[Tlhere are
no data to support the benefits of delayed assignment or treatment of these infants
and I cannot imagine any parent, without whose wholehearted cooperation any
treatment program will fail, accepting such an approach." Glassberg, Editorial, supra
note 85.
110. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 85, at 385; Groveman, supra note 84, at 356.
111. See Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 11, at 298 (discussing and citing medical
literature recommending sex reassignment based on surgical potential); Nussbaum,
supra note 12, at 93-94 (noting that treatment remains essentially unchanged with
exception of a minority of physicians and recent critical publications); see also
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 56-58; KEsSLER, supra note 12, at 108-109
(discussing criteria for surgery in females and males); Donahoe, supra note 12, at 527
(commenting, "[g]enetic females should always be raised as females, preserving re-
productive potential, regardless of how severely the patients are virilized. In the
genetic male, however, the gender of assignment is based on the infant's anatomy,
predominantly the size of the phallus."); Newman et al., supra note 12, at 645
(commenting, "In practical terms, regardless of the genotype, most children with
ambiguous genitalia are best suited for the female role.").
112. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 34-35; MONEY & EHRHARDT, MAN & WoMAN, supra
note 12, at 178-79; MONEY, SEx ERRORs 1994, supra note 17, at 82.
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determinant of whether a genetic male should be surgically reassigned," 3
even over male reproductive capacity."' As Money explained for infants,
"'Too small now, too small later' is a useful working rule with regard to
construction or reconstruction of a penis.
' 1
5
C. Standard Care and Malpractice Claims
In medical malpractice cases, courts often hold physicians to a
standard of care that differs from ordinary principles of negligence. 6 In
general negligence law, a jury's view of "reasonable prudence" can pre-
vail over a deficient standard of care in a particular profession or
industry.'1 7 As Judge Learned Hand explained,
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common pru-
dence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available de-
vices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usage's. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission. s
While "[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be
done,"1 9 Judge Hand reminds us that no profession is so collectively
infallible that custom alone should establish reasonable prudence in
every instance.
120
113. See, e.g., Donahoe, supra note 12, at 527 ("[I]Rt cannot be overly stressed that the 46,
XY [genetic male] karyotype does not dictate rearing the child as a male if the phallus
is inadequate in size.... If the phallus length is less that 2.0 cm and certainly less
that 1.5 cm, we are quite concerned."); King, supra note 12, at 369; Grumbach &
Conte, supra note 2, at 1400-1404.
114. Some but not all intersex and ambiguous conditions impact reproductive capacity.
Standard care encourages preservation of female reproductive capacity but decisions
as to males is based on penis size, not reproductive capacity. See Donahoe,.supra note
12, at 527.
115. MONEY, SEx ERRORS 1994, supra note 17, at 66.
116. See generally FuxRow, supra note 52, at § 6-2, at 361; Sam A. McConkey, Simplifying
the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use ofPractice Guidelines as the Standard of Care
in MedicalMalpractice Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. Rav. 491, 496-97 (1995).
117. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
118. See T.J Hooper, 60 F.2d, at 739.
119. Texas Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
120. See T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 739.
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However, the prevailing view is that "[tlhe law generally permits
the medical profession to establish its own standard of care."'.. A physi-
cian must exercise "the degree of knowledge, skill, and care used by
other physicians practicing the same specialty."2 2 "[A] physician is neg-
ligent when the physician does an act which a reasonably careful
physician would not do or fails to do an act which a reasonably careful
ihysician would do.' '1a Physicians are not guarantors of positive out-
comes, absent their own express promises;' 24 there is "no presumption of
malpractice from the mere fact of injury."25
Allowing the medical community to abide by its own established
standard of care means that when the profession "unduly lags" or adopts
a negligent standard of professional care, tort law's deference to those
standards will preclude liability.12 6 Ordinarily, expert testimony is essen-
tial to establish the medical standard of care and a jury is seldom
allowed to substitute its own evaluation of the reasonableness of that
standard. 27
There are a few notable cases rejecting this extraordinary deference
to an unassailable medical-community-based standard, most notably,
Helling v. Carey.1as In Helling, a 32 year old plaintiff suffered vision loss
as a result of glaucoma.22 The plaintiff asserted that the ophthalmolo-
gist was negligent for not conducting glaucoma screening. At the time
121. Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372 (N.Y. 1968); see also
FuRRow, supra note 52, at 359-62.
122. Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423, 427 (Colo. 1997) (en banc).
123. Gorab, 943 P.2d at 427 (quoting Colorado Jury Instruction 15:2).
124. See Turner v. Children's Hosp., Inc., 602 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
125. Turner, 602 N.E.2d at 427.
126. See Harris v. Groth, 663 P.2d 113, 115 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (discussing defer-
ence); see generally Hall, supra note 49, at 126-27 (noting distinction between
"garden-variety tort cases" where jury is "ultimate arbiter" and medical malpractice
where "jurors are instructed to judge physicians not by the jury's sense of what is
right, but by the custom that prevails in the profession"); Gary T. Schwartz, Medical
Malpractice, Tort, Contract, andManaged Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. Rav. 885, 890.
The existence of a uniform standard of care is probably more of a legal fiction
than medical profession fact. See Hall, supra note 49, at 121 n.10, 128-30 n. 38
(commenting "the law has always presumed the existence of that which does not ex-
ist-established, concrete professional standards").
127. See Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 149 (Haw. 1995) ("It is well settled that in medi-
cal malpractice actions, the question of negligence must be decided by reference to
relevant standards of care for which plaintiff carries the burden of proving through
expert testimony"). See also FuRRow, supra note 52, at 361 (commenting that "[t]he
standards for evaluating the delivery of professional medical services are not normally
established by either judge or jury").
128. 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
129. See Helling, 519 P.2d at 982.
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the plaintiff suffered injury, the standard practice was to test persons
over the age of 40 because incidence of glaucoma increased with age and
was uncommon in younger persons. 3 However, glaucoma testing was
also inexpensive, simple and posed no appreciable harm to patients.
Relying on Judge Learned Hand's formulation of reasonable care, the
Washington Supreme Court held that physicians could be held negli-
gent as a matter of law even when they conformed their treatment to
the standard practice of the medical community.132 The court explained
that although early glaucoma testing did not represent "the standards of
the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is
required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of glau-
coma." 33  Notably, following Helling the Washington legislature
attempted to clarify the state's deferential standard and retreat from the
ordinary negligence principles Helling established.
34
Helling is generally regarded as a minority view1 35 and has been
130. See Helling, 519 P.2d at 982.
131. See Helling, 519 P.2d at 983.
132. See Helling, 519 P.2d at 983 (citing The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932))
(holding that irrespective of medical standards, reasonable prudence would require
providing inexpensive pressure tests to all opthalmological patients where the test is
inexpensive and simple).
133. See Helling, 519 P.2d at 983.
134. In Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983), the Wash-
ington Supreme Court recounted the professional and legislative reaction to its
decision in Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). Harris, 663 P.2d at 115-
16. Notably, Harris held that even following the legislature's purported overruling of
Helling, Washington continues to hold to a "reasonably prudent" physician and that
"[t]he degree of care actually practiced by members of the profession is only some
evidence of what is reasonably prudent-it is not dispositive." Id. at 120. See Lent,
supra note 56, at 829-30.
135. See FuRRow, supra note 52, at 361 ("Most jurisdictions.., have been reluctant to
follow Helling in replacing the established medical standard of care with a case-by-
case judicial balancing."). Cases in apparent accord with Helling include: United
Blood Services, Div. of Blood Systems, Inc. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo.
1992) (en banc) (holding deficient):
If the standard adopted by a practicing profession were to be deemed con-
clusive proof of due care, the profession itself would be permitted to set the
measure of its own legal liability, even though that measure might be far
below a level of care readily attainable through the adoption of practices
and procedures substantially more effective in protecting others against
harm than the self-decreed standard of the profession, but holding that ex-
pert testimony is necessary to establish that one school of practice's
standard of care is unreasonably deficient;
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criticized by legal scholars. 136 As one commentator remarked, "[i]n all
other areas of tort law, the jury retains the power to find that the entire
industry has 'unduly lagged;' in malpractice cases-and these alone-
the jury is typically deprived of this power. " '37
The risks of applying ordinary negligence to medical malpractice
include usurping of the profession's autonomy and substituting a jury-
or judge-decreed standard of care. Standards of care developed through
litigation may be faulty or costly. However, there is also a risk to ac-
cording deference. 38  As one commentator noted, "[t]he legal
malpractice framework may actually serve to entrench poor standards
into mainstream practice, as adherence to custom is the benchmark by
which a physician's procedure is measured."'39 Indeed a common ad-
Townsend v. Kiracoff, 545 F. Supp. 465, 468 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) ("even if the defendant's affidavits and eviden-
tiary materials could establish that the hospital acted in accordance with the standard
of care and custom of the community of Colorado hospitals, the plaintiff would still
be entitled to prove at trial that the entire community's custom is negligent"); Turner
v. Children's Hospital, 602 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ohio App. 1991) ("although custom-
ary practice is evidence of what a reasonably prudent physician would do under like
or similar circumstances, it is not conclusive in determining the applicable standard
required."); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. 1996) (denying that tra-
ditional malpractice standard differs from ordinary negligence).
136. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 101, 125-26 (Cal.
App. 1992) (rejecting Helling v. Carey, and noting that most commentary and case
law has been critical of the case); Clark Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law
Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 LAw & CoNTEM'. PRoBs 143,
159 n. 45 (1986); Schwartz, supra note 126, at 890; cf Dan Dobbs et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 33 at 30 n. 53 (noting "increasing number of courts re-
jecting customary practice standard in favor of reasonable care or reasonably prudent
doctor standard" and citing cases) (5th ed. 1988 pocket part); Theodore Silver, One
Hundred Years of Harmfrl Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1212-19 (arguing for a return to negligence principles).
137. Schwartz, supra note 126, at 890; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 663
(1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law] (noting that Helling v.
Carey has not garnered support, "[malpractice] conservatism has largely survived the
1980s"); c Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care:
A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1483,
1502-06 (1989) (arguing that courts and juries have too much independence to es-
tablish and judge the medical standard of care and proposing judicial deference to
professionally promulgated guidelines).
138. See Kacmar, supra note 59, at 631-32 (noting in malpractice actions there is sub-
stantial reliance on the medical profession to define its own standard of care and lack
of incentive to keep abreast); Silver, supra note 136, at 1212-19; Leahy supra note
137, at 1495-97.
139. Kacmar, supra note 59, at 643.
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monition to new doctors echoes this idea: "You will seldom be sued if
,,140you do what your teacher taught you.
Judging the standard of care is also difficult because standards
evolve over time. While standard care requires that physicians "keep
abreast" of "customary practice" as it develops and changes,141 few cases
actually find liability based on the failure to keep pace with changingS 142 comny
professional standards. More commonly, a physician who follows old
practices will not be viewed as having failed to keep abreast of medical
advances; rather his divergence more likely will be characterized as a
difference of opinion in a divided medical community. In fact, disa-
greement among practitioners is a common occurrence: "[ol]n many
matters the medical community is divided as to the preferred method of
therapy or treatment." 43 Generally, malpractice law protects those
within a divided medical community; a physician following one of two
schools of thought will enjoy freedom from liability even if the treat-
ment chosen proves ineffective.' While there are exceptional cases,
14 1
140. Sackett reports on studies showing years from medical school negatively correlates
with up-to-date knowledge. SACKaTT, supra note 61, at 9.
141. See Rooneyv. Medical Center Hosp. of Vermont, 649 A.2d 756, 759 (Vt. 1994):
To practice the profession of medicine, a physician is not required to be
possessed of the extraordinary knowledge and ability that belongs to the
few practitioners of rare endowments. But the physician is required to keep
abreast of new techniques and knowledge and to practice in accordance
with the approved methods and means of treatment in general use [in his
field].
See also Kacmar, supra note 59, at 641.
142. See Angela Roddey Holder, Failure to "Keep up"as Negligence, 224 JAMA 1461, 1462
(1973).
143. Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law, supra note 137, at 664.
144. See Hood v. Philips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App. 1976) (holding "a physician is
not guilty of malpractice where the method of treatment used is supported by a re-
spectable minority of physicians, as long as the physician has adhered to the
acceptable procedures of administering the treatment as espoused by that minority").
See also Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent
Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration, 98 DicK. L. Rnv. 713 (1994);
Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law, supra note 137, at 664-65 (commenting that
traditional tort law has held that "when intelligent doctors can disagree, the defen-
dant cannot be found guilty of malpractice").
145. An alternative view is possible, one in which the two schools might be measured
against one another. One court reasoned that where two schools differ, "plaintiff
should be permitted to present expert opinion testimony that the standard of care
adopted by the school of practice to which the defendant adheres is unreasonably de-
ficient by not incorporating readily available practices and procedures substantially
more protective against the harm caused to the plaintiff than the standard of care
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the general rule is that so long as the medical community remains di-
vided; malpractice law offers little protection to patients caught in the
middle of an evolving standard of care.
Surgical treatment of ambiguous genitalia in infancy exemplifies an
instance where prevailing medical wisdom, in an area of great signifi-
cance to individuals and their families, developed without any
conclusive evidence that surgical intervention was appropriate. Because
surgical intervention developed without sufficient scientific inquiry and
validation of its long-term success, the premises behind judicial defer-
ence toward the medical community, at least in the types of cases
presented herein, are not particularly compelling.46
The basic reason why professionals are usually held only to
a standard of custom and practice is that their informed ap-
proach to matters outside common knowledge should not be
"evaluated by the ad hoc judgments of a lay judge or lay jurors
aided by hindsight." In the words of a leading authority,
"When it can be said that the collective wisdom of the profes-
sion is that a particular course of action is the desirable course,
then it would seem that the collective wisdom should be fol-
lowed by the courts." 11
7
Thus, based on an assumption that the community standard is a
product of collective wisdom and not of collective ignorance or a herd
mentality, courts defer to the community standard. Courts presume
that standards of care develop from scientific inquiry and validation, not
from mere anecdotal evidence. But such is not always the case.'48 De-
spite a lack of confirming research it became "fairly common to
recommend to ... parents that they raise a male baby with micropenis
as a girl"'49 and "fairly common to remove the enlarged, masculine-
adopted by the defendant's school of practice." United Blood Services v. Quintana,
827 P.2d 509, 521 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
146. Furrow notes that "clinical innovation allows physicians to vary standard treatment
to suit the needs of a particular patient, where the patient presents a particular prob-
lem or desperate situation." FuRRow ET AL., supra note 52, at § 6-5, at 385.
However, he notes that courts rarely allow such a defense except in instances "when
conventional treatments are largely ineffective or where the patient is terminally ill
and has little to lose by experimentation with potentially useful treatments." FuRRow
ET AL., supra note 52, at § 6-5, at 385.
147. Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 101, 125-26 (Cal. App.
1992) (citations omitted).
148. See generally McKinlay, supra note 56.
149. See MONEY, Sax ERRORs 1968, supra note 17, at 48.
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looking clitoris" of female-assigned hermaphrodites and pseudoher-
maphrodites.'" By rejecting ordinary negligence principles in
malpractice cases where treatment is not based upon collective wisdom
but something much less, courts insulate the medical professional from
liability for its collective shortcomings.
Moreover, the deferential standard reinforces professional inertia.
Others have observed that slowness to change, even after new informa-
tion comes to light, is not uncommon:
Perhaps more troubling [than adopting a standard without
rigorous testing] is that even when trials are conducted, and
the results published, physicians may not change their behav-
ior, particularly when the trials report negative findings.
Studies of the impact of [randomized controlled trials] on the
practice of medicine, from the 1960s through the 1980s, have
consistently found that [randomized controlled trials] have
little direct impact on physician's practice."'
When judicial deference allows the medical community to establish
its own standards of care, courts surrender power to "in the end say
what is required," 1 2 and allow the profession instead "to set the measure
of its own legal liability, even though that measure might be far below a
level of care readily attainable through the adoption of practices and
procedures substantially more effective in protecting others against
harm than the self-decreed standard of the profession." ' This is par-
ticularly so when the profession has not even abided by its own
recommendations for the evaluation of a standard or guidelines for
managing some specific clinical problem. 5 4 By allowing the medical
community to set the standard by which negligence is determined and
150. See MONEY, SEX ERRORs 1968, supra note 17, at 93.
151. See King & Henderson, supra note 57, at 1021; see also Lent, supra note 56, at 808.
152. United Blood Services v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
(quoting The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
153. See United Blood Services, 827 P.2d at 520.
154. Sackett discusses the problem of how clinicians can determine whether guidelines are
valid. See SACKErr, supra note 61, at 114-16. Four guides were offered for the
evaluation of a proposed medical guideline: 1) Were all important decision options
and outcomes dearly specified?; 2) Was the evidence relevant to each decision option
identified, validated and combined in a sensible and explicit way?; 3) Are the relative
preferences that key stakeholders attach to the outcomes of decisions (including
benefits, risks and costs) identified and explicitly considered?; 4) Is the guideline re-
sistant to clinically sensible variations in practice? See SACKE-Tr, supra note 61, at 115.
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by protecting the divided medical community, tort law renders itself
impotent to promote positive changes within the medical community.
5
III. PARENTAL CONSENT TO GENITAL SURGERY AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT ON BEHALF OF CHILDREN
This section explores the informed consent doctrine and the chal-
lenges of actualizing informed consent in the context of infant medical
care. This section also confronts the questions of how and why parents
consent to radical, life-altering treatment of their intersex or mutilated
infants and why the safeguards of informed consent seemingly fail. An
atmosphere of urgency, partial and inaccurate disclosure of the condi-
tion and risks, a sense of secrecy and shame all impede true informed
consent. Worse, both doctors and parents fail to include the child's
right to self-determination in the decisional calculus.
A. The Doctrine ofInformed Consent
The informed consent doctrine ' 56 preserves a patient's right to
make medical decisions on his or her own behalf.157 It protects "'the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."" 58 Two key interests are at stake:
bodily integrity and self-determination." 9 "The law of informed consent
is predicated on notions of patient sovereignty and serves to safeguard
the patient's right of choice."'
60
155. See generally Kacmar, supra note 59, at 633-39.
156. See generally RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMp, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (tracing history and discussing moral underpinnings of
informed consent doctrine in medical tradition).
157. See Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Liti-
gated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FoiwiwAm L. REv. 2075, 2093-94 (1996).
158. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
159. See Hawkins, supra note 157, at 2094-2102 (other interests include privacy, to be
free of unwanted physical invasions, and preservation of life); James Bopp, Jr. &
Richard E. Coleson, A Critique of Family Members as Proxy Decisionmakers Without
LegalLimits, 12 IssuEs L. & MED. 133, 134-35 (1996); see also In re Fiori, 673 A.2d
905, 909-10 (Pa. 1996) (commenting, "[t]he right to refuse medical treatment has
deep roots in our common law... From this right to be free from bodily invasion
developed the doctrine of informed consent").
160. Turner v. Children's Hosp., Inc., 602 N.E.2d 423, 431 (Ohio App. 1991).
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Generally, informed consent includes an obligation to provide rele-
vant information concerning alternatives to the proposed treatment,161
including "material risks incident to abstention from treatment." 162 Al-
though some courts continue to follow an older physician-oriented
standard and measure the adequacy of disclosure with reference to the
custom and standard within the medical community,1 63 the decisional
trend over the past two decades has been toward a patient-oriented
standard, with reference to "what a reasonable person objectively needs
to hear from his or her physician to allow the patient to make an in-
formed and intelligent decision regarding proposed medical
treatment."164
The modern trend of judging informed consent by a patient-
oriented standard stands in stark contrast to a physician-oriented stan-
dard for judging the standard of medical care. ' 65 Under the patient-
oriented standard of informed consent, "what the medical community
believes the patient needs to hear in order for the patient to make an
informed decision is insufficient, without more, to resolve the question
of what an individualpatient reasonably needs to hear in order for that
patient to make an informed and intelligent choice regarding the pro-
posed medical treatment."' 6  The modern, patient-oriented standard
does not shield physicians just because their disclosure conforms to the
161. See Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 493 (Haw. 1995).
162. Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 375 (S.D. 1985) (citing Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
163. See William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a "Material Information"
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OsLA. L. REv. 711, 716-17 (1995)
(describing state trends); see generally Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of
Views as to General Measure of Physician s Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed
Treatment, 88 A.L.Rt3d 1008; Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the Limits ofInformed
Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wisc. L. REv.
1079, 1082-86 (discussing patient-oriented standard and describing trends).
164. Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 500 (Haw. 1995). The seminal case rejecting the phy-
sician-oriented standard and adopting the patient-oriented standard is Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cit. 1972). See also Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d
765 (Ohio 1973); Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547 (Or. 1988); Corrigan v. Meth-
odist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676
(R.I. 1972); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998); Stripling v. McKin-
ley, 746 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App. 1988), affd, 763 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1989).
165. See Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423, 428 n.5 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (noting eviden-
tiary differences between patient-oriented informed consent doctrine and medical
community standard of care).
166. Carr, 904 P.2d at 499 (emphasis in original). Physicians must provide information
concerning "material risks" and, at least in some jurisdictions, they must provide in-
formation about alternative treatments. See Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 30-31
(Iowa 1991).
2000]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
established custom of their peers if that standard is inadequate to meet
the needs of the particular patient.'67 Thus, in jurisdictions employing a
patient-oriented standard of informed consent, patient autonomy rights
prevail over medical-community standards.'68
The trend toward judging the adequacy of disclosure from the pa-
tient's vantage is justified because the patient-oriented standard "better
respects the patient's right of self-determination and affixes the focus of
the inquiry regarding the standard of disclosure on the motivating force
and purpose of the doctrine of informed consent-aiding the individual
patient in making an important decision regarding medical care."'
69
Under either a patient-oriented or physician-oriented standard,
physicians do not need to disclose information when the physician de-
termines that the risk of disclosure poses a threat "of detriment to the
patient as to [make disclosure] become unfeasible or contraindicated
from a medical point of view."' 70 Commonly known as the "therapeutic
privilege," this exception to disclosure protects physicians from claims
when the physician determines that disclosure would carry risks to the
patient.
The classic therapeutic privilege case concerns a patient with pecu-
liar apprehension or nervousness that suggests to physicians that full
disclosure might pose additional health risks.17' Then, "[t]he medical
167. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) ("A medical doctor, being
the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks
of a decision not to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful out-
come of the treatment .... The weighing of these risks against the individual
subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and
decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone."); Cooper v. Rob-
erts, 286 A.2d 647, 650-51 (Pa. 1971) ("As the patient must bear the expense, pain
and suffering of any injury from medical treatment, his right to know all material
facts pertaining to the proposed treatment cannot be dependent upon the self-
imposed standards of the medical profession."). Applying Cobbs, physicians are ex-
pected to explain the probability of success and to tell patients what they mean by
success. See George J. Annas, Informed Consent, Cancer, and Truth in Prognosis, 330
NEw ENG. J. MED. 223, 225 (1994).
168. See Annas, supra note 167, at 225 ("Of course, the doctrine of informed consent is
based on the recognition that people are not all the same and that physicians must let
patients decide about treatment options so that they do not treat them 'always the
same way for everybody alike.'") (quoting LEo ToIsToy, The Death of Ivan llych, in
THE D.ATH OF IVAN ILYCH AND OTHER STORIES 95 (Aylmer Maude trans., The
New American Library of World Literature, Inc. 1960).
169. Carr, 904 P.2d at 499.
170. Canterburyv. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
171. See Carr, 904 P.2d at 494; Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 119-21 (Haw. 1970),
overruled on other grounds (patient's fear and apprehension justified not telling him of
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standard ... [is] that a competent and responsible medical practitioner
would not disclose information which might induce an adverse psycho-
somatic reaction in a patient highly apprehensive of his condition." 72 In
practice, few cases actually rely on the privilege as an excuse for nondis-
closure. 73 Importantly, commentators and courts recognize that liberal
invocation of the privilege nullifies the general obligations of disclosure
and respect for patient autonomy and self-determination and should
therefore be discouraged.
74
B. Informed Consent and Parental Decision Making on Behalfoflnfants
While children and incompetents possess bodily integrity and self-
determination rights in theory,'75 finding a practical framework that
allows others to make decisions and yet assures the correctness of those
decisions for that patient presents a legal and ethical challenge.176 The
"collateral hazard" of paralysis associated with diagnostic procedure regarding aneu-
rysm).
172. Nishi, 473 P.2d at 121.
173. See McNichols, supra note 163, at 728-79 & n.97 (noting scarcity of decisions based
upon therapeutic privilege defense). Compare Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579,
583 (Ala. 1962) (finding disclosure adequate and noting, "Doctors frequently tailor
the extent of their pre-operarive warnings to the particular patient, and with this I
can find no fault. Not only is much of the risk of a technical nature beyond the pa-
tient's understanding, but the anxiety, apprehension, and fear generated by a full
disclosure may have a very detrimental effect on some patients.") with Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 700 (Minn. 1977) (rejecting therapeutic privilege defense
where doctor testified that "he did not want to concern [the patient] with what he re-
garded as a foregone conclusion").
174. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792; McNichols, supra note 163, at 728.
175. See Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Mich. App.
1992) (commenting, "[tihe right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment is not lost be-
cause of the incompetence or the youth of the patient"); Custody of a Minor, 393
N.E.2d 836, 844 (Mass. 1979) (stating that incompetent persons enjoy "the same
panoply of rights and choices" of competent persons) (citation omitted).
176. See generally American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Informed
Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, in POLICY REFERENCE
GUIDE 496 (1997) (also available at 95 PEDIATRICS 314 (Feb. 1995)); Joseph P.
McMenamin & Karen Iezzi Michael, Children as Patients, in LEGAL MEDICINE 396
(American College of Legal Medicine ed., 4th ed. 1998); Bopp & Coleson, supra
note 159; Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future,
28 RUTGERS L.J. 549 (1997); Leslie P. Francis, The Roles of the Family in Making
Health Care Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 861; Leonard H.
Glantz, Research with Children, 24 Am. J.L. & MED. 213 (1998); Marcia Gottesman,
Civil Liability for Failing to Provide Medically Indicated Treatment" to a Disabled In-
fant, 20 FA. L.Q. 61 (1986); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions
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primary obligation for making medical decisions on behalf of children
resides with the child's parents and the obligation to disclose informa-
tion about treatment runs to them.' 7
While the standard by which courts judge surrogate decision mak-
ing on behalf of incompetents is a "substituted judgment standard," 7 '
for infants the standard is better viewed as a "best interest standard"
since an infant has no prior judgment from which decision-makers
might draw.179  Parental determinations of the child's best
interest are accorded deference in order to protect family privacy and
parental authority and autonomy; this authority, once based on a no-
and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); Hawkins, supra
note 157; Robert J. Katerberg, Institutional Review Boards, Research on Children, and
Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between Encouraging Vital Experi-
ments and Protecting Subjects' Rights, 24 J.C. & U.L. 545 (1998); Ann MacLean
Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for Minors in a Persistent Vegetative State: Parents
ShouldDecide, 35 ARiz. L. Ray. 173 (1993); Andrew Popper, Averting Malpractice by
Information: Informed Consent in the Pediatric Treatment Environment, 47 DEPAUL L.
REv. 819 (1998); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refase Treatment, 69 N.C. L. Rav. 945
(1991); Robyn S. Shapiro & Richard Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: An Ef-
fective Approach to the Baby Doe Dilemma?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827 (1986); Walter
Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent,
State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. Rav. 311; Rachel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone
Marrow Donations By Children: Rethinking the Legal Framework in Light ofCurran v.
Bosze, 24 CONN. L. Rav. 211 (1991); Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing for Children:
Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
157 (1983).
177. Conceptually, the parent's duty to make decisions is sometimes characterized as a
parental right. When the law views the parental obligation to make decisions as a pa-
rental right, then the child's rights might be subordinated to their parents. See
INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, MEDICAL RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN: ETHICS, LAw,
AND PRACTICE 132 (Richard H. Nicholson ed. 1986). Whether viewed as a right or
duty, parental decisions are cloaked in deference arising out of the right to privacy
and the right to parental autonomy under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
178. The judicial decision maker "must 'substitute itself as nearly as may be [possible] for
the incompetent and... act upon the same motives and considerations as would
have moved' the incompetent." DuFault, supra note 176, at 221 (quoting City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945)).
179. "The fundamental difference between the use of substituted judgment and the 'best
interests of the child test' under such conditions, lies not in the decision reached,
which may be the same, but in the vantage from which the decision is reached." Du-
Fault, supra note 176, at 227. See Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 639 (discussing
difference and commenting that preference in surrogate decisionmaking is to use a
substituted judgment standard and best interest standard where a preference was
never stated or is otherwise unknown); see also Catherine L. Annas, Irreversible Error:
The Power and Prjudice ofFemale Genital Mutilation, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
PoL'Y 325, 337 n. 123 (1996).
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tion of "children as chattel,'" ° is now premised on the belief that "the
natural bonds of affection" motivate parents to act in the child's best
interest.' The law presumes that "family members are generally most
concerned with the welfare of a patient.
" 
1
2
The authority of parents to make medical decisions, however, is
not unbridled and the state may intervene where parental decision
making seemingly fails to adequately protect the interests of the child.'83
Usually, conflicts between physicians and parents draw the state into
medical treatment controversies. It is unusual that anyone champions
the interests of the child when the treating physician and parents agree
on treatment, even though the child may have conflicting interests.
8 5
One notable exception to the general rule that no judicial review is
necessary when parents and doctors are in accord is with regard to in-
voluntary sterilization decisions. 86 Even when doctors and parents
agree, significant statutory and common law oversight of the decision to
involuntarily sterilize incompetents has developed in most states in or-
der to prevent hasty involuntary sterilization of the mentally impaired,'
87
180. Dufault, supra note 176, at 214-215.
181. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also In re L.H.R. 321 S.E.2d 716, 722
(Ga. 1984); Dufault, supra note 176, at 218-19; Hawkins, supra note 157, at 2081;
Sher, supra note 176, at 171-72.
182. Fiori v. Pennsylvania, 673 A.2d 905, 912 (Pa. 1996) (citation omitted)
(acknowledging right of mother to order removal of life support of adult son in per-
sistent vegetative state).
183. See In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 n. 6 (Ga. 1992) (commenting that parents do not
have an "absolute right to make medical decisions for their children"); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 177, at 133-34 (discussing limits of parental authority);
McMenamin & Michael, supra note 176, at 397; Dufault, supra note 176, at 213-16
(tracing historical perspective of parental right to make medical decisions); see also
Povenmire, supra note 91, at 107-09.
184. See Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Mich. App.
1992) ("We hold that the decision-making process should generally occur in the
clinical setting without resort to the courts, but that courts should be available to as-
sist in decision making when an impasse is reached.").
185. See Sher, supra note 176, at 168-69 (noting that the courts resolve conflicts between
the state and the parent and "few courts recognize that children have an interest to
articulate independent of their parents or the state").
186. See generally ROGER B. DwoRKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BioETHiCAL
DECISION MAKING 54-60 (1996) (approving the increasingly adopted judicial case-
by-case approach in involuntary sterilization cases); Povenmire, supra note 91, at
107-08.
187. See generally Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8
BERKELEY WOMEN'S .J. 122 (1993) (describing statutory and case law approaches to
sterilization of mentally disabled); Elizabeth Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded
Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 818 (noting
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especially in childhood."' 8 "Any exercise of state power to order the non-
consensual sterilization of an individual must be scrutinized carefully
because of the individual's rights and interests that are at stake.""8 9 Ap-
pellate courts caution lower courts that, "because sterilization necessarily
results in the permanent termination of the intensely personal right of
procreation, the trial judge must take the greatest care to ensure that the
incompetent's rights are jealously guarded." 90
Notwithstanding the general rule of careful judicial scrutiny in in-
voluntary sterilization cases, the ethical issues surrounding genital
surgery on the intersex child have not drawn much attention until very
recently, although such surgery poses serious risks to the intensely per-
sonal rights related to identity and erotic and possibly reproductive
potential.' 9' Critics of surgical interventions on intersex infants contend
that ethical considerations warrant more attention from judges and
ethicists than they currently receive.'92 For example, requiring physicians
and parents to establish the necessity of such surgery by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence might be justified because of the life-long impact of
the surgery on crucial aspects of life.' 9
In surrogate decision making outside of compulsory sterilization,
judicial involvement is not the norm unless parents and physicians disa-
gree.' However, it remains useful to consider how courts generally
"[m] ost laws.., embody strict procedural and substantive requirements that create a
strong presumption against sterilization").
188. See DWoRlN, supra note 186, at 58; Scott, supra note 187, at 848 n. 140; see, e.g.,
Haw. Rev. Star. § 560:5-602 (1993) ("[plersons who are wards and who have at-
tained the age of eighteen years have the legal right to be sterilized .... In no event,
however, shall wards be sterilized without court approval .... unless sterilization oc-
curs as part of emergency medical treatment").
189. In the Matter of Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (denying
guardian's request to sterilize brain-injured adult).
190. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (affirming mother's request
to sterilize adult mentally retarded daughter) (quoting In re Mildred J. Terwilliger,
450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)).
191. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 28-29 (noting medical tendency to preserve female
reproductive capacity but not male reproductive capacity).
192. See KEsSLER, supra note 12, at 77-104, 132; Dreger, History, supra note 83, at 353;
Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 406-07; Povenmire, supra
note 91, at 122-23 (arguing for a heightened ethical evaluation in male circumcision
cases as well).
193. Povenmire proposes this standard for evaluating male circumcision decisions, causing
parents to weigh the medical justifications for the procedure against the procedure's
irreversibility and the child's inability to consent. See Povenmire, supra note 91, at
102-03.
194. See, e.g., Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (reviewing jurisdictions and holding that no judicial application is re-
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evaluate infant medical treatment cases. Parental decisions to deny
medical treatment for religious'95 or other reasons196 may be challenged
by the state and set aside by court if those decisions are deemed not in
the child's best interest. While "parental autonomy is constitutionally
protected," the state, as "guardian of society's basic values" sometimes
has an overriding duty to protect children. 97 When opinions on the ad-
visability of treatment conflict between parents and physicians, ethicists
often advise weighing three factors in evaluating whether to interfere in
parental decision making: 1) the decisional capacity of the minor; 2) the
burden and risk of treatment; and 3) the effectiveness of the treat-
198
ment.
While the first factor, decisional capacity, is seemingly inapplicable
in considering medical treatment for infants, the infant's future
quired prior to removing life-support from minor in persistent vegetative state); ac-
cord In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984) (holding that no prior
judicial approval is necessary prior to termination of life-support of minor).
195. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(App. Div. 1971) (ordering surgery to correct facial deformity despite only psychoso-
cial risk for nontreatment alternative and surgical risk to health); State v. Perricone,
181 A.2d 751 (NJ. 1962); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See generally Sher, supra note
176, at 161, nn. 19-23 (collecting cases).
196. See, e.g., A.D.H. v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 640 So.2d 969 (Ala. Civ. App.
1994) (ordering AZT treatment for AIDS); Petra B. v. Eric B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342
(Ct. App. 1989) (ordering medical treatment for burns where parents are treating
child with herbal remedies); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978)
(holding that child's best hope for recovery required chemotherapy despite and over
parental concern for discomfort and parental pessimism); In re Vasko, 263 N.Y.S.
552 (App. Div. 1933) (ordering surgical removal of cancerous eye despite parental
objection); In re Rotkowitz, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. ReL Ct. 1941) (ordering op-
eration on foot to correct progressive deformity). But see In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d
820 (N.Y. 1955) (upholding right of parent to decide not to treat cleft palate and
harelip); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1912) (holding parents could decide to
withhold surgical intervention for deformity caused by rickets because they feared
possible outcomes).
197. Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46 (quoting In re Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50-
51 (Ct. App. 1979)).
198. See generally Kenneth Kipnis, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment on Religious
Grounds: Pediatric Ethics and the Children of Christian Scientists, in LIBERTY, EQUAL-
ITY AND PLURALITY 268, 272-74 (Larry May et al. eds., 1997); HUMAN RESEARCH
SUBJEcrs, supra note 50, at 6-18 to 6-25 (discussing considerations when children
are subjects of research); Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject
Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 189-90 (1998). See also Petra B., 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 346 (holding that the state may intervene upon consideration of the
"seriousness of the harm," the "evaluation for the treatment by the medical profes-
sion," the "risks involved in medically treating the child," and the "expressed
preferences of the child") (quoting In re Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51).
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decisional capacity should be protected when decisions can be post-
poned. Protecting that potential decisional capacity remains a relevant
consideration when weighing irremediable medical intervention such as
the destruction of reproductive and erotic capacity or infringement on
gender options."" Under a trust model of decision making that seeks to
preserve a child's "right to an open future,"00 parents should attempt to
safeguard a child's right of autonomy"' and be "constrain[ed] ... from
consenting on the child's behalf to that which may impair the enjoy-
ment of autonomy at maturity."202
The second factor, consideration of the risks and burdens, includes
weighing both the possibility of a positive outcome as well as the
"human costs of getting there."2 3 When the burden and risk are great,
treatment may carry too high a price to be justified notwithstanding
potential benefits. 24
Finally, as to the third factor, decisionmakers must "consider
whether the treatment is likely to be effective in securing some
significant and subjectively valuable benefit for the child." 205
"Demonstratively effective" treatments should be considered more
valuable than "experimental or investigational" treatments.206 The
burden should be on proving the enhancement of the quality of life
rather than the absence of harm.
C. The Problems oflnformed Consent and Infant Genital Surgery
In order to weigh the risks, benefits, burdens and effectiveness of
treatment parents need information concerning the proposed treatment.
However, perhaps acting in part out of an ill-conceived concept of
199. See Scott, supra note 187, at 849 n. 142 (noting the difficulty in assessing "how
someone will function or act in the future").
200. See Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AuT osurv, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken &
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
201. See Feinberg, supra note 200, at 126, 151 ("if the child's future is left open as much
as possible for his own finished self to determine, the fortunate adult that emerges
will already have achieved, without paradox, a certain amount of self-fulfillment, a
consequence in large part of his own already autonomous choices in promotion of his
own natural preferences."); Dufault, supra note 176, at 218-19.
202. INS-rITuTE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 177, at 131.
203. Kipnis, supra note 198, at 273.
204. See Kipnis, supra note 198, at 273.
205. Kipnis, supra note 198, at 273.
206. Kipnis, supra note 198, at 273.
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therapeutic privilege, parents sometimes have been deprived of key in-
formation.
Importantly, the effectiveness of informed consent must be tested
by both the content and manner of disclosure."' This section questions
how parental consent was secured for genital surgery. In particular, this
section explores five grounds for criticizing the consent obtained by
some practitioners in these cases: 1) the false aura of urgency; 2) the
failure to impart complete and accurate information; 3) the oppressive
secrecy in which parents were advised to not discuss the situation with
others and to particularly withhold all information from the child;
4) the failure of physicians to reveal the uncertainty of the outcome; and
5) the failure to account for the child's "right to an open future" in the
decisional calculation.
1. The Aura of Urgency
Clinicians have long imparted a sense of medical urgency to par-
ents upon the birth of an intersex child.20 ' Although the intersex state is
typically not life-threatening, parents are counseled to act quickly in
207. See Morin, supra note 198, at 191.
208. See Perlmutter, supra note 12, at 2 ("[t]he birth of an infant with genital ambiguity
constitutes an urgent medical and social problem that requires a careful and thorough
assessment to make an appropriate gender assignment as soon as feasible"); Wilson &
Reiner, supra note 62, at 368 (commenting, "[ilt is interesting to note that ambigu-
ous genitalia are essentially the only congenital anomalies viewed as a surgical
emergency for cosmetic reasons."); Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 93 (describing the
medical characterization of intersex as a "'social and psychological emergency").
In the John/Joan case, the child's parents recalled how rushed they were to make
the agonizing decision. In fact they received a letter from Money suggesting they
were "procrastinating." They polled their family and their pediatrician, all of whom
counseled against the surgery. But, they were persuaded by Dr. Moneys "conviction
that the procedure had every chance for success." Colapinto, supra note 11, at 64.
The informed consent process has not changed very much. Nussbaum describes
a case in 1998. A psychologist on the treatment team "warned the family that with-
out cosmetic surgery Emma might suffer from gender confusion and reassured Vicki
that she knew well-adjusted girls who had received such operations." Nussbaum, su-
pra note 12, at 95. Although the parent asked to meet "at least one adult intersexual
who was happy with his or her childhood surgery" no name was ever provided.
Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 95. The surgeon informed the parents "Emma would
have an easier life as a female." Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 95. The mother reported
that the physician did admit the possibility of the child's later regret. "He said,
'There's a group of people who believe we're doing the wrong thing. In 30 years we
may find out they're right, but for now, this is the best we know how."' Nussbaum,
supra note 12, at 95.
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order to establish a sex of rearing that is unequivocal."9 Many medical
texts classify this decision-making process as a medical emergency.1 0
Clinicians develop a treatment plan to facilitate conforming the child to
a sex within days of birth.2  Money counseled parents to act quickly
and to delay announcing the sex of a child born with ambiguity to avoid
the trauma and embarrassment of a reannouncement of the child's sex
and name.21"
Despite the impression of urgency that clinicians create, much
surgical treatment of the genitals is essentially cosmetic and not
medically urgent.213 Instead, the message of urgency is based upon social
and psychological considerations, including stigmatization and the
nurture assumption.1 4 Compassion for the parents and concern that
209. See KESSLER, suepra note 12, at 17-21; Cowley, supra note 74, at 65.
210. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 30 (citing Patricia K. Donahoe et al., Clinical Manage-
ment ofIntersexAbnormalities, 28 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SURGERY 515, 540 (1991)).
Actually only the "salt-losing" category of CAH requires immediate attention. In rare
conditions, gonads are prone to development of malignant tumors and may be re-
moved prophylactically, but such surgery can be delayed. See Diamond &
Sigmundson, Management oflntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047.
211. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 21-24; Dreger, supra note 12, at 27 ("In an effort to
forestall or end any confusion about the child's sexual identity, clinicians try to see to
it that an intersexual's sex/gender is permanently decided by specialist doctors within
forty-eight hours of birth.").
212. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 17 (quoting a urologist, "'One of the worst things is to
allow them [the parents] to go ahead and give a name and tell everyone, and it turns
out the child has to be raised in the opposite sex.'") (alteration in original); MONEY,
SEx ERRORS 1994, supra note 17, at 65-66.
213. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047
(cosmetic clitoral and sex reassignment surgery should be postponed until "the pa-
tient is able to give truly informed consent"); Dreger, supra note 12, at 30 (stating the
clinicians view intersex states as a "social emergency"); Nussbaum, supra note 12, at
93; Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 368.
One might argue, as has psychologist Meyer-Bahlburg that the adult actions and
beliefs are predicated on what happens starting from infancy and therefore neonatal
surgery is beneficial and not "merely" cosmetic since it will facilitate adjustment to
the assigned gender. See Meyer-Bahlburg, supra note 87, at 14. However, no con-
trolled study supports this thesis. The premise is quite dubious: parents must consent
to emergency surgery on their infant's genitalia to prevent psychosocial harm at a
later date.
214. See Timing of Elective Surgeiy, supra note 12, at 590 (expressing concern that these
congenital defects "may influence the mother's attitude toward child" and noting dis-
advantage of "prolonging the child's 'defective' status and crystallizing any disruption
in family relationships that the child's condition may have produced"); Cowley, supra
note 74, at 65 (reporting view that physicians view "creating a normal appearance" as
urgent). Instead of "normalizing" the sex organs, Diamond urges clinicians to counsel
parents "that appearances during childhood, while not typical of other children, may
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they would not bond1 5 also prompts urgency; "the medical team will
recommend that surgical therapy begin early in order to spare parents
the trauma of seeing their child as intersexed each time they change the
infant's diaper."
21 6
Critics argue that none of the core premises on which early surgery
was based justify urgency. First, the theory that children raised unambi-
guously with normalized genitalia would accept the gender of rearing
was untested by reliable studies.217 In truth, physicians could not confi-
dently assert, based on data, that surgery imposed at any age would be
any more or less successful.
Second, the stigma clinicians feared would befall a child in the
locker room could be mitigated through less drastic alternatives than
immediate surgical alteration.18 When Diamond and Sigmundson first
recommended a moratorium on most cosmetic infant genital surgery,
they nevertheless supported the early decision to socially assign the child
to boy or girl classification. 2 9 They merely opposed taking the
be of less importance than functionality and postpubertal erotic sensitivity." Dia-
mond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047.
215. See MONEY, SFx ERRORs 1994, supra note 17, at 82-83 (cautioning that parents of
children with birth defects of sex organs "may despise, criticize, and avoid the pa-
thology in their child who, in turn, feels despised, criticized and avoided as a
person."); see also, Timing ofElective Surgery, supra note 12, at 590.
216. Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 363 (citing Heino F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg, Gender
Assignment in Intersexuality, 10 J. PSYCH. & HuMAN SaxuALiTr 1-21 (1998)).
217. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Management oflntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1048.
218. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 128-32; Dreger, supra note 12, at 32-33. Moreover,
the haste and secrecy produces its own shame and stigma. See DREGER, supra note 72,
at 192 (quoting Sherri A. Groveman, "the greatest source of anxiety... is (the]
shame and fear resulting from an environment in which our condition is so unac-
ceptable that caretakers lie"); Robert A. Couch, Betwixt and Between: The Past and
Future of Intersexuality, 9 J. CLiN. ETHICS 372, 375 (1998) (noting that discomfort
with intersexuality is culturally constructed); Sharon Preves, For the Sake of the Chil-
dren: Destigmatizing Intersexualiy, 9 J. CLIN. ETics 411, 415 (1998) (noting that
surgery compounds shame rather than erasing it, and that parents might have been
taught to deal with their different child rather than misguided attempts to
"normalize" them through radical surgery); Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 364
(commenting that silence produces "significant feelings of shame"). There is increas-
ing recognition that gender exists along a continuum, much as medicine and society
desire a binary gender construct. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 132; Terry S. Kogan,
Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom Labeled "Other, "
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1233, 1238 (1997); see also Brynn Craffey, Showering "Sans Penis,"
2 CHRYSALIS: J. TRANSGRESsivE GENDER IDENTITIES 55-56 (1997).
219. Diamond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047. See
also KESSLER, supra note 12, at 119-32; Cowley, supra note 74, at 66 (reporting on
recommendations of ISNA and biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, "raise a child in the
sex that seems most comfortable").
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irreversible surgical step of removing body parts, while still
recommending children be raised with a clear gender status based on
which gender will most likely develop.22 They wrote, "[i]n rearing,
parents must be consistent in seeing their child as either a boy or a girl;
not neuter. In our society intersex is a designation of medical fact but
not yet a commonly accepted social designation."22'
Finally, recommending prompt surgery based on the fear of pa-
rental rejection and failure to bond is premised more on medical
opinion than fact. 2 Critics contend that while "Money has presented
some data that having a child with ambiguous genitalia causes parental
stress .... support for the second part of that hypothesis, that the stress
on the parent (and presumably also child) is alleviated by surgical cor-
rection, is entirely absent. "223 As Alice Dormurat Dreger noted, even if
physicians were motivated by a singular desire to alleviate psychosocial
problems of both the family and the child, "it is not self evident that a
psychosocial problem should be handled medically or surgically. We do
not attempt to solve the problems many dark-skinned children will face
in our nation by lightening their skins."224 In addition, parental anxiety
and distress can be enhanced by this medical attention rather than re-
duced. Parental tension and stress can be reduced by managing the
intersex condition as a normal variation and imparting to the parents
the knowledge that the genital variation, if of adolescent or adult con-
cern, can be dealt with at a later age. Moreover, recommending surgery
based on a concern for the sensibilities of parents and others is not ap-
propriate, as only the best interest of the child is relevant. 25
220. Diamond and Sigmundson's views are supported by ISNA, an organization of and
for adult intersexuals. ISNA, supra note 109; Chase, supra note 85, at 385.
221. Diamond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047.
222. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 74-76. In regard to the effect on parents, even Money
has written: "More than one-half of the parents (8/14) underwent only a short-lived,
minor degree of crisis precipitated by having a micropenis baby [that they were told
would need to be reassigned as a girl]. None had an extreme degree of crisis." John
Money er al., Micropenis, Family Mental Health, And Neonatal Management: A Report
On 14 Patients Reared as Girls, 1 J. PREENTrE PSYCHIATRY 17-27, 17 (1981).
223. Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 367.
224. Dreger, supra note 12, at 30.
225. See Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (Md. App. 1993); Wentzel v. Montgomery
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1245 (Md. 1982) ("in considering the best inter-
ests of an incompetent minor, the welfare of society or the convenience or peace of
mind of the ward's parents or guardian plays no part"); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d
427, 428 (Pa. Super. 1994) (quoting In the Matter of Mildred J. Terwilliger, 450
A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. 1982)) ("[I]n making the decision of whether to authorize
sterilization [of an incompetent adult], a court should consider only the best interest
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2. Imparting Incomplete Information
Clinicians treating children with congenital birth defects some-
times fail to impart accurate and complete information for a variety of
reasons. 226 The problem of inadequate disclosure during neonatal medi-
cal crises is not confined to the intersex infant:
The information available to the family in a medical crisis is
quite often inadequate. Some have suggested that this problem
is rooted in the complete dependence and lack of power of the
patient and family. All information, of both the particular and
general medical type, is held by the hospital staff. Physicians
also have a propensity not to admit the limitations of their
professional knowledge and ability. Additionally, the use of
medical jargon during counseling clouds the ability of parents
to be fully informed.227
Information about the diagnosis, the efficacy of treatment, and
complications may be incomplete. Intersexed individual Howard De-
yore, a practicing psychologist who counsels other intersexed persons,
has himself had 16 surgeries to repair his severe hypospadia. He com-
plains physicians are too optimistic about the outcome:
[In regard to the surgery] there's going to be scarring and
stricture formation and loss of sensation. No scar tissue is as
flexible as skin. There's no way they can deny that. The
'informed consent' they give parents to sign is totally unrealis-
tic. One of our main issues is that parents are told after a few
surgeries, their children will have 'normal genitals.'22s
As to explaining the nature of the condition, Money contended
that in counseling, "parents [need to] have the necessary medical infor-
mation (albeit somewhat simplified) [in order] to be able to explain
of the incompetent person, not the interests or convenience of the individual's par-
ents, the guardian or of society.").
226. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 159, at 142 (discussing studies demonstrating ten-
dency of physicians to withhold information or not to admit the "limitations of their
professional knowledge and ability").
227. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 159, at 141-42.
228. Yronwode, supra note 85. Complications, surgical failures and the necessity for mul-
tiple surgeries are high in genital surgery on children. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra
note 11, at 86-87.
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their dilemma to themselves prior to explaining it to other people."229
However, full and complete disclosure about the condition was gener-
ally not advised by professionals. Instead, counselors were advised that
they should explain to parents that the child was "sexually unfin-
ished."2'0°The concept that these children are "unfinished" is particularly
deceptive because it implies that with more gestational time unambigu-
ous sex organs would have developed and that physicians are not
"changing" something fundamental about the child but are merely
"finishing" the child's incomplete anatomy.23l While simplistically ap-
pealing, the concept of being "unfinished" leaves parents ill-equipped to
make thoughtful decisions. y2 As Suzanne Kessler points out, by em-
229. MONEY, Sax ERRORs 1968, supra note 17, at 62-63; MONEY, Sx ERRORS 1994,
supra note 17, at 67.
230. MONEY, Sx ERRORs 1968, supra note 17, at 62. One of the patients discussed in the
beginning of this paper reports that his parents were told he needed "corrective" sur-
gery but never appreciated the nature of their child's condition. A physician candidly
recalled to a reporter how he and his colleagues counseled parents of intersex chil-
dren:
[A] pediatric endocrinologist at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago,
would draw a pair of X's [on a blackboard]. This, he would say, was what a
normal female's sex chromosomes looked like: XX.
Then, with the heel of his hand, he would erase the leg of one X. That, he
would say was what happened to one of their daughter's X chromosomes.
It was incomplete, unfinished. This was why her sexual organs hadn't de-
veloped the way they should, why her breasts would not grow, why she
couldn't ever have children.
What he did not say is that the "incomplete" X was not an X chromosome
at all. It was a Y chromosome, the genetic marker for a male.
The child they were talking about was not a girl, at least not so far as her
genes were concerned. She was a boy.
Louise Kiernan, In Intersex Cases, Gender is a Complex Question, CHICAGO TiuB.,
June 20, 1999, at 1-1 (interviewing Jorge Daaboul). Nussbaum provides a recent ac-
count of a 1998 case where the parents were better informed about the condition,
Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 93-94, but still the parents were apparently not fully
informed about the lack of long-term studies. In that case, the parent informed her-
self of contrary opinions through contacts with ISNA, yet ultimately chose surgery
for the child. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 95.
231. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 50 (describing counseling techniques);
IKESSLER, supra note 12, at 21-24 (describing information provided to parents during
diagnosis and noting deceptive and incomplete information imparted); ciOLAPINTO,
supra note 11, at 95; Dreger, supra note 12, at 31 (recounting anecdotal reports of
parents and adult patients being misinformed and deceived about the nature of the
condition and the treatment); Cowley, supra note 74, at 64, 66.
232. The concept that intersex infants are incomplete may promote maternal guilt that
more gestational time would have completed the infant's sexual characteristics.
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ploying the "unfinished" concept clinicians are suggesting to parents
that it is the genitals that are ambiguous and not the gender:
The message... is that the trouble lies in the doctor's ability
to determine the gender, not in the baby's gender per se. The
real gender will presumably be determined/proven by testing,
and the "bad" genitals (which are confusing the situation for
everyone) will be "repaired." The emphasis is not on the doc-
tors' creating gender but in their completing the genitals.
Physicians say that they "reconstruct" the genitals rather than
"construct" them.... The fact that the gender in an infant is
"reannounced" rather than "reassigned" suggests that the first
announcement was a mistake because the announcer was
confused by the genitals. The gender always was what it is
now seen to be. 23'
Physicians have provided parents information that simplistically
concentrates attention on creating typical appearing genitals. For the
parent with an intersex child or a male child without a penis, this is be-
guiling because it offers hope that physicians and parents can correct the
condition by the surgical assignment of sex and careful rearing. Yet,
physicians have long known that sex determination and sex differentia-
tion are far more complex than what a child's genitals look like.34
Merely changing the genitals does not alter the chromosomal, genetic or
hormonal determinants of sex and so does not change an intersex child
or a male without a penis (as J/J was) into an infant of the assigned sex.
Surgery merely alters one aspect of sex differentiation: the appearance of
the genitals. Moreover, infant cosmetic surgery on the genitals and
215careful rearing cannot erase the prenatal influences on sexual identity.
Thus, at best, physicians adhering to Money's theories could offer par-
ents a child that "looked" like a child of the assigned sex and parents
might rear a child to "act" like a child of the assigned sex. But parents
233. KESSLER, supra note 12, at 23.
234. Intersex is not merely a condition of the genitals, but of a sexually dimorphic brain.
See Reiner, Teenage Girl, supra note 96 (noting the complexity of intersex conditions
and uncertainty as to causes); see also Milton Diamond, Human Sexual Development:
Biological Foundation for Social Development, in HUMAN SEXUALITY IN FOUR PER-
SPEcTrVEs 22, 38-39 (F.A. Beach ed., 1976); Grumbach & Conte, supra note 2, at
1304-31.
235. Grumbach & Conte, supra note 2, at 1330 (discussing role of prenatal hormones and
other influences on sexual identity and acknowledging scientific uncertainty as to the
determinants of sexual identity).
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needed to understand that, given the complexities of sex determination,
they would never have a typical child of that assigned sex, nor could
they change fundamental aspects of sex differentiation that the child
retained.
Parents require detailed information about the condition, the effi-
cacy of treatment and the alternatives in order to weigh the burdens of
surgically assigning a child to a gender, risking reproductive and erotic
possibilities, necessitating future surgeries and lifelong medical and
hormonal treatment.2"
3. Perpetuating Secrecy and Deception
Deception and secrecy are probably the most unusual and harmful
..• 237
aspects of the medical treatment prescribed for intersex conditions.
Money contended that the sex of rearing must be unequivocal and as a
result, the treatment necessarily justified deception as the children ma-
tured. But, as the children grew older, this secrecy and deception had
the added consequence of preventing their participation in later treat-
ment choices. 238 Parents were counseled to raise these children without
236. In the context of involuntary sterilization generally, one court commented, "An indi-
vidual's right to procreate is fundamental.... Sterilization involves a surgical
invasion of bodily integrity. It destroys 'an important part of a person's social and
biological identity,'... can be traumatic for the individual, and can have 'long-
lasting detrimental emotional effects.'" In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo.
1990) (en banc) (citations omitted) (upholding right of incapacitated mother of two
to refuse sterilization where she expressed desire to have additional children).
237. A recent prize-winning student essay advocates deception in the case of androgen
insensitivity syndrome (AIS) discovered at adolescence. KS patients with the com-
plete form of this condition are genetic males who, for lack of receptors necessary to
masculinize, will grow up looking like females and developing a female sexual iden-
tity but possessing an underdeveloped vagina and lacking ovaries. The condition is
sometimes overlooked until adolescence when it is discovered because the child fails
to menstruate. The medical student argues that both the parents and the adolescent
child should be shielded from knowledge of AIS. Since, "[tihe only services the phy-
sician can provide are surgical reconstruction of the vagina and counselling on
adoption,. . . [the author suggests that if] the patient is completely comfortable with
her female sexuality.. . [then] physicians who treat KS patients are justified in not
disclosing the information that the patient is genetically male." Anita Natarajan,
Medical Ethics and Truth Telling in the Case ofAndrogen Insensitivity Syndrome, 154
CANADIAN MED. ASs'N J. 568, 568-69 (1996).
238. See Colapinto, The True Story, supra note 11, at 95. J/J resisted hormone treatment
and four years of unyielding pressure and deception by both Dr. Money and her local
treatment team to undergo vaginal reconstruction. See Colapinto, The True Story, su-
pra note 11, at 70-71; see also FAusTo-STERLING, supra note 11, at 64-66 (discussing
secrecy and deception); Groveman, supra note 84, at 357-59 (discussing life with
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equivocation as to the child's assigned sex and to withhold information
from the child so that the child would feel secure in his or her gender.23
9
AIS, recounting surgery and ongoing medical treatments, stating that doctors
"implored my parents never to tell me the truth" and describing how she finally dis-
covered her AIS diagnosis at age 20 by conducting her own medical detective work).
239. Wilson and Reiner describe the rationale for that secrecy:
At the time of initial gender assignment, to protect the child's psychosexual
development from potentially hurtful comments, physicians have generally
counseled families not to discuss any of this with other family members or
friends. Further, based on the theory that any doubt may undermine de-
velopment of a gender identity concordant with the assigned sex of rearing,
they also advise the family not to discuss the child's condition with the
child.
Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 363. Wilson and Reiner explain that as medical
records become more easily obtainable, secrecy is increasingly unrealistic and out of
step with current views of patient rights and patient autonomy. See Wilson & Reiner,
supra note 62, at 364; see also Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at
1026 ("Parents and clinicians have often concealed aspects of surgery and treatment
from the child and excluded maturing children from medical management deci-
sions .... Adults who underwent these procedures in childhood are now presenting
at clinics ignorant of their history."); Dreger, supra note 12, at 27, 30-32
("Clinicians treating intersexuality worry that any confusion about the sexual identity
of the child on the part of relatives will be conveyed to the child and result in enor-
mous psychological problems, including potential 'dysphoric' states in adolescence
and adulthood."); Groveman, supra note 84, at 357 (commenting that, when parents
received AIS diagnosis and were told of the infant surgery, "the sole instruction my
parents received... was one of 'damage control,' calculated to confirm a solid image
that I was their daughter in the same breath that doctors enjoined them that they
should not disclose my true diagnosis to anyone, least of all me.").
Money suggests that displayed ambivalence to the gender assigned is fatal to
success. See MONEY, SEx ERRORs 1994, supra note 17, at 66 ("If a change must be
made [in the announcement of sex], then it should be made only once and forever,
with no delay or vacillation."); MONEY, Sax PoLicE, supra note 30, at 319
(suggesting that "[t]he effect of hearing about one's infantile medical history from the
children of adult members of the community grapevine" was a possible factor in the
explanation for the failure of J/J's case). Fundamentally, Money's idea of a success
was measured by whether the sex-reassigned person accepted without question the
imposed gender switch. MONEY, MAN & WoMAN, supra note 12, at 153, 178-79.
Arguably, a superior measure of success is whether the individual, given all the facts,
would have made that gender decision or would have chosen to maintain the im-
posed gender.
Money acknowledged that secrecy was problematic in practice and so eventually
advocated disclosure.
The withholding of information can be extremely traumatic, as the patient
will soon realise that things are being withheld and will resort to inferential
guesswork. ... When they grew up, several of these [hermaphroditic] pa-
tients confronted me with the folly of this policy, for they had known all
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The medical community's enthusiasm to raise intersexed or sex-t,• 24'0eaue
reassigned babies without ambiguity is necessarily deceptive because,
despite the dogma, the child's genitals and not the child's gender were
211
rendered unequivocally male or female by surgery. Secrecy persists
even today, as one physician recently explained, "[ilf they have an ex-
cellent outcome and they look perfect, ... I would want to downplay
[the original ambiguity] as much as possible."
242
In a revealing case study debated in the Hastings Center Report,
ethicists considered whether either a sixteen-year-old female or her par-
ents should be informed when the teen seeks treatment for failure to
menstruate. 243 Upon discovery "that the girl has an XY genotype, a ge-
netic abnormality called testicular feminization" 24 4 and "precancerous
testes that require surgical removal" and will need vaginal surgery to
have intercourse, the question arose whether the child or the parents
should be told the genetic information or the fact that she is "'really a
guy.' " 245 The treating physician wonders whether he can withhold the
along that they had been dealt with insincerely. In the majority of in-
stances, they also knew exactly what information was being withheld....
John Money, Birth Defect of the Sex Organs: Telling the Parents and the Patient, 10
BRIT. J. SEXUAL MED. 14, 14 (1983) [hereinafter Money, Birth Defect].
240. In her prize winning essay, Natarajan urges physicians to keep secret the genetic male
status of women with androgen insensitivity. She reasons that the knowledge will be
too psychologically damaging for them and so justifies the ethics of deception. See
Natarajan, supra note 237, at 570.
KS women themselves, on the other hand, express a desire to know the truth of
their condition. See Anonymous, Letter to Editor, 154 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J.
1832, 1832 (1996); Sherri A. Groveman, Letter to the Editor, 154 CANADIAN MED.
Ass'N J. 1829, 1832 (1996); B. Diane Kemp, Letter to the Editor, 154 CANADIAN
MED. AS'N J. 1829, 1829 (1996). Co-author Milton Diamond's present research
with 50 persons with KS supports the contention that patients desire to know their
complete history.
241. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 27-30. Moreover, when patients are not given complete
information about their birth, they sometimes do not appreciate the sex-related risks
they continue to bear. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 32-33.
242. Cowley, supra note 74, at 66 (quoting Dr. Antoine Khoury, chief of pediatric urol-
ogy at Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children).
243. See Sherman Elias & George Annas, Commentary, The Whole Truth and Nothing But
the Truth, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Oct./Nov. 1988 at 35, 35-36; Brendan P. Mi-
nogue & Robert Taraszewski, Commentary, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the
Truth? HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34 Oct./Nov. 1988, at 34.
244. Case Studies: The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct./Nov. 1988, at 34, 34. Because of current sensitivity to the effect on the patient
of labeling the condition "testicular-feminization" the condition has been relabeled
"androgen insensitivity syndrome" (KS). See MONEY, SEx ERRoRs 1994, supra note
17, at 27.
245. Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 34.
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information until the child is twenty-one. 246 Two authors suggest that
the physician's concern is justified. 7 They accept that the child's
parents might become "emotionally distraught" and come to regard her
as a "freak" or might at some point divulge the harmful information to
her.28 The authors conclude that if "the functions of guardians to secure
the wishes and welfare of minors ... [cannot] be secured by disclosing
[the patient's] genetic identity to her parents, then there seems no sound
ethical reason to disclose this information in these circumstances." 249
Addressing two fundamental questions, the authors reason:
"Would a typical physician act differently from [the hypo-
thetical doctor withholding information]?" The answer is
"No!" Some, of course might inform her, but disclosing the
information is by no means customary within the profes-
sion .... "Would a hypothetical reasonable person want this
information revealed to her at this time?" Probably not. What
reasonable person would needlessly choose to make a bad
situation worse?
250
The essay authors suggest that a loosely-constructed therapeutic
privilege applies to justify long-term deception of both the patient and
the teen's parents based merely on the physician's belief that reasonable
patients would not want to know such matters. Yet, contrary to this
position, the judicial construction of the informed consent doctrine as-
sumes patients want to know what is relevant and material to their
condition.2 1 As the Canterbury court cautioned when fashioning this
therapeutic privilege to withhold information from the patient,
246. See Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 34.
247. See Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 34.
248. Cf Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 34-35 (recognizing the physician's
concerns surrounding disclosure).
249. Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 35. The authors suggest the information
is not "relevant" since nothing can be done and all "immediate problems can be ad-
dressed without revealing the information about her genetic abnormality." Minogue
& Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 34.
An alternate position has been advanced that suggests that full disclosure rather
than deception to both parents and child may be preferable. See Elias & Annas, supra
note 243, at 35-36.
250. Minogue & Taraszewski, supra note 243, at 35.
251. A physician bears the burden of producing evidence that the therapeutic privilege
negates the duty to disclose, and only then, "the patient has the ultimate burden of
proving the nonexistence of the exception." Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 676, 684
(Haw. App. 1995), cert. granted and clarified on other issues, 903 P.2d 667 (1995).
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The physician's privilege to withhold information for thera-
peutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed, however, for
otherwise it might devour the rule itself. The privilege does
not accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may re-
main silent simply because divulgence might prompt the
patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really
needs. That attitude presumes instability or perversity for even
the normal patient, and runs counter to the foundation prin-
ciple that the patient should and ordinarily can make the
choice himself. Nor does the privilege contemplate operation
save where the patient's reaction to risk information, as rea-
sonably foreseen by the physician, is menacing. And even in a
situation of that kind, disclosure to a close relative with a view
to securing consent to the proposed treatment may be the only
alternative open to the physician. 2
Physicians both marginalized the participation of parents and en-
listed parents in maintaining secrecy into their children's adulthood253
without contemplating the actual risk of disclosure to the patient based
on the unproven premise that unambiguous genitals, unequivocal child-
rearing practices and a lack of information about the original condition
would benefit children. The social and psychological costs and the
252. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See also
McNichols, supra note 163, at 728 (commenting with approval on the narrow scope
of therapeutic privilege crafted by Canterbury).
253. The J/J case, communications from former patients, and ISNA discussions share a
striking common theme that information, even in adulthood, was desperately wanted
but difficult to obtain. See Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at
406-07. These stories suggest a deviation from the so-called common view:
[A] physician has a fiduciary duty to inform a patient of abnormalities in
his or her body. The basis of this duty is that the patient has a right to
know the material facts concerning the condition of his or her body, and
any risks presented by that condition, so that an informed choice may be
made regarding the course which the patient's medical care will take, The
patient's right to know is not confined to the choice of treatment once a
disease is present and has been conclusively diagnosed. Important decisions
must frequently be made in many non-treatment situations in which
medical care is given, including procedures leading to diagnosis .... These
decisions must all be taken with the full knowledge and participation of
the patient.... The existence of an abnormal condition in one's body, the
presence of a high risk of disease.... are all facts which a patient must
know in order to make an informed decision on the course which future
medical care will take.
Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919, 922-923 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (citation omitted).
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medical damage that secrecy can promote were left out of the equa-
tion.
211
A last cost of secrecy should be mentioned. Typically, patients
eventually discover their condition from an inadvertent family slip,
community gossip or personal investigation into puzzling aspects of
their lives. The patients thus learn what they were never supposed to
have found out. Even more disturbing to them, the former patients dis-
cover that their deformities are unspeakably shameful in the minds of
parents and physicians. This revelation, usually coming without sup-
port, can be devastating.255 They wonder why they were not accepted
and loved as they were. This makes manifest the fear of romantic/erotic
relations and reduces the pursuit of intimate contacts. Last, former pa-
tients learn that since childhood they have been systematically deceived
by the very people who should have been the most trustworthy: parents
and physicians. The harm caused by deception is needless25' and often
drives a wedge between the children, their parents, and physicians that
persists into adulthood. Critics of deception argue that honesty, full dis-
closure, and counseling is a therapeutically superior approach.257
254. See Preves, supra note 218, at 414.
255. The experience of Cheryl Chase, Director of the Intersex Society of North America,
is instructive
At the age of 35 Chase had a nervous breakdown. Although she had been
able [with difficulty] to access her medical records in her early 20s,....
[tlhe years of secrecy, unexplained surgeries, and sexual dysfunction caused
by removal of her clitoris had taken a huge toll on her. "Until I was 35, I
was ashamed and terrified that people would find out that I was different
than a woman. Like many, supposedly happy and successful patients, I was
silenced."
Yronwode, supra note 85, at 1. Money counseled against secrecy by 1983:
I learned my lesson, the hard way, particularly in those cases in which the
parents forbade the transmission of any of the diagnostic history and clini-
cal information to the child. When they grew up, several of these patients
confronted me with the folly of this policy, for they had known all along
that they had been dealt with insincerely.
Money, Birth Defect, supra note 239, at 14.
256. See Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 407; Diamond, Pediatric
Management, supra note 87, at 1026.
257. See, e.g., Diamond & Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality, supra note 11, at
1048; Dreger, supra note 12, at 31-32; Elias & Annas, supra note 243, at 35-36;
Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 407; Preves, supra note 218, at
417-18.
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4. Failing to Disclose The Uncertainty of the Long-Term Outcome
Parents consenting to surgeries might have responded differently
had they understood the innovative nature of the treatment;258 certainly
it was the obligation of clinicians to so inform them.259 However,
because the J/J case as originally presented had become a classic for the
academic and medical community,260 cliniciansprobably projected more
confidence in the procedure than it deserved. Clinicians asserted the
potential for successful "normalization" because the literature suggested
such, when, in fact, insufficient data existed to support their premises.
262
Indeed, clinicians were advised as recently as 1994, to project
confidence in the treatment recommendations when counseling parents:
This [simplified medical] knowledge will help [parents] feel
convinced that what is being done is correct and that it is their
own decision as well as that of experts. Otherwise, they might
easily feel that they are acquiescing to an intervention based on
trial and error, which mightprove to be all error.
63
As to treatment of micropenis in particular, Money counseled:
It is [...] fairly common to recommend to the parents that
they raise a male baby with micropenis as a girl. This is, of
course, a very difficult decision for parents to make, and they
must be given all the information possible to understand the
rationale and consequences of the decision. First and
258. The premise that the surgery would be successful was so ingrained that one 1998
nursing journal characterized refusal to consent to sex assignment surgery as child ne-
glect. See Rossiter & Diehl, supra note 12, at 61. However, a responsive comment by
Anita Catlin noted that the success of intersex surgery is so uncertain that parental
refusal should not be overridden. Anita J. Catlin, Ethical Commentary on Gender Re-
assignment: A Complex and Provocative Modem Issue, 24 J. GYNECOLOGICAL &
NEONATAL NURSING 63 (1998).
259. See FuRRow, supra note 52, at 386-87 (commenting, "courts seem willing to tolerate
clinical innovation so long as a patient is properly informed as to the innovative and
untested nature of the procedure").
260. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11, at 1046.
261. See Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 406 ("it is not possible for
a patient's parents to give informed consent to these procedures, precisely because the
medical profession has not systematically assessed what happens to the adults these
infant patients become.").
262. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 32; Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at
1026.
263. MONEY, Sax ERRORS 1994, supra note 17, at 67 (emphasis added).
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foremost, they [parents] need to know that gender identity and
role are not preordained by genetic and intrauterine events alone,
but that their differentiation is also very much a postnatal
process and highly responsive to social stimulation and
experience. Thus, they need to be reassured that their baby can
grow up socially as a girl and fall in love as afemale.2
The assurances that counselors were urged to convey concerning
the effectiveness and foundation of the treatment were not accurate be-
cause the only experience which clinicians could report was actually
drawn from anecdotal and incomplete case reports that were appearing
in the medical literature.265 Thus, practitioners who followed the coun-
seling advice misled parents by reassuring them that the treatment could
work without a sound basis for that premise.
5. Ignoring the Child's Right to an Open Future
Surgical intervention has been promoted as a way to offer the inter-
sexed child a more "normal" life. Remarkably, proponents of surgical
treatment ignore the possibility that the child might one day have a
different concept of "normal" and want to choose a different course of
treatment, or none at all.266 Surgical proponents discount the possibility
that the intersexed adult might desire to participate in their treatment
decisions.267
264. MONEY, SEx ERuoas 1994, supra note 17, at 54 (emphasis added).
265. Indeed, the American Academy of Pediatrics, in its 1996 recommendations on tim-
ing male genital surgery, stated "a person's sexual body image is largely a function of
socialization" referencing only the decade-old and older work of John Money. Tim-
ing ofElective Surgery, supra note 12, at 590.
266. There is no doubt that doctors are choosing treatments based on social or personal
value judgments; consider the following quote concerning clitoral surgery that favors
appearance:
The clitoris is not essential for adequate sexual function and sexual gratifl-
cation... but its preservation would seem to be desirable if achieved while
maintaining satisfactoy appearance and function.... Yet the clitoris clearly
has a relation to erotic stimulation and to sexual gratification and its pres-
ence is desirable, even in patients with intersexed anomalies if that presence
does not interfere with cosmetic, psychologicaZ social and sexual adjustment.
KESSLER, supra note 12, at 37 (quoting Judson Randolph & Wellington Hung, Re-
duction Clitoroplasty in Females with Hypertrophied Clitoris, 5 J. PEDiATRiC SURGERY
224, 230 (1970)).
267. Wilson and Reiner comment:
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A relevant rule extrapolated from the ethics surrounding the ge-
netic testing of children is emerging that would weigh more heavily on
the child's autonomy and right to an open future when making elective
medical decisions. Recently, Laurence McCullough, medical ethicist at
Baylor College of Medicine Center for Medical Ethics and Health Pol-
icy recommended:
When genetic conditions for which a child is at risk do not
have biopsychosocial consequences until adolescence or adult-
hood, genetic testing for such condition should be postponed
until later when the child can engage in informed assent as an
adolescent or informed consent as an adult. Intersex condi-
tions that neither are life-threatening nor involve chronic
morbidity should be managed under this rule. Intersex condi-
tions that are chronic and that involve manageable
psychosocial consequences until adolescence or adulthood
should be managed under this rule. 6
Thus, he recommends that in balancing the desirability of normal-
appearing genitalia with the foreclosure of the child's ability to later
consent, the scales tip in favor of delaying treatment.269
[T]he right of the individual to determine what happens to his or her body
has been increasingly asserted. Patients and families are demanding a voice
in the issue of sex assignments and therapies. After all, the child's sex-of-
rearing and gender identity are profoundly important to that child's life-
long development and adjustment. Although parents may give consent for
surgery, there is increasing movement toward obtaining a child's assent to
procedures, particularly those which, like most genital "reconstructive"
procedures, are elective from a medical viewpoint. This means delaying
surgery until we can take into account the affected individual's determina-
tion of his or her own gender.
Wilson & Reiner, supra note 62, at 364; see also Schober, supra note 95, at 394 ("For
the best long-term outcomes, we need to consider that surgical treatment methods do
not 'cure' intersexuality, and that a procedure such as vaginoplasty should address a
consenting and requesting patient's needs and desires, not parental and societal
comfort.").
268. Laurence McCullough, "The Ethics of Gender Reassignment," Presentation at con-
ference 1999 Pediatric Gender Reassignment: A Critical Reappraisa Dallas, Texas
(April 30, 1999). See also Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an
Open Future, 28 RuTGERs L.J. 549, 575-81 (1997) (noting and approving of trend
against conducting genetic tests to predict late-onset diseases and suggesting that par-
ents who opt for testing "preclude the child's right and opportunity to make that
decision for himself in adulthood").
269. In a 1998 case described by Nussbaum, the parents ultimately consented to surgery,
even knowing the possibility the child might reject the assigned gender. They re-
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IV. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: WHAT SHOULD THE FUTURE HOLD?
Some people increasingly doubt the efficacy of early surgery and
many more acknowledge that more study is needed.2 0 Given the cur-
rent state of medical knowledge, ethical considerations suggest the
course of treatment should change. Medical uncertainty, the infant's
inability to consent to this life-altering treatment and the child's right to
an open future suggest that a "moratorium" on infant surgery is the best
course when surgery is solely intended to cosmetically change ambigu-
ous genitals. 1
These critics argue that parents of children with ambiguous genita-
lia would be better counseled to manage the psychosocial consequences
of genital differences in childhood rather than opting for a surgical re-
sponse. Nonsurgical approaches, such as individual and family
garded the potential social rejection of ambiguous gender as more destructive than
the possibility the assigned gender would ultimately be rejected or the child would
have lessened sexual sensitivity:
"As parents, we're often forced to make decisions for our children that are
hard. And this is one of'em, as far as I'm concerned." If Emma has regrets,
Vicki [the mother] said, she'll be able to blame her family instead of her-
self. But Vicki's worst nightmare was that Emma might grow up and
identify as male. In that case, it would be too late.
Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 97.
270. See supra note 95.
271. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 74; Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at
1025-1026; Diamond & Sigmundson, Management ofIntersexuality, supra note 11,
at 1047; Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 405-406; Reiner, Sex
Assignment, supra note 82, at 1044. Kipnis and Diamond also recommend the
moratorium remain in effect until the positive value of the surgery is documented
with adequate follow-up study. Kipnis & Diamond, supra note 11. Others remain
convinced that cosmetic clitoral surgery is appropriate. See Meyer-Bahlburg, supra
note 109, at 15; Glassberg, supra note 85, at 152-153 (both defending cosmetic sur-
gery). While suggesting that surgery continue on ambiguous genitalia, Glassberg is
also open to change:
... we must learn from patients who resent how they were treated and
those who are satisfied. If data become available to prove that a given ap-
proach should be changed, we should do this promptly. Today with valid,
unbiased follow up data, and genetic, pharmacological and surgical tools,
we should be able to produce a satisfying outcome for nearly all children
born with this potentially devastating problem.
Glassberg, supra note 85, at 1309.
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counseling to mitigate the stigma and develop coping strategies, preserve
272
a child's right to self-determination.
Those who have already undergone surgical treatment present
other ethical dilemmas in light of the revelation that some continue to
struggle with gender confusion, have unanswered medical questions and
cannot obtain information as to what surgical procedures were per-
formed on them when they were infants. There is no rational reason
why secrecy surrounding the early treatment should persist into adult-
hood. The incomplete or inaccurate medical information can result in
mistaken assumptions about the actual health risks individuals bear.23
For example, gonadectomy exposes patients to a definite risk of osteo-
porosis and creates a need for life-long hormone replacement and
medical management.274 Adult intersexed individuals report that their
attempts to obtain a clear diagnosis and understanding of the treatment
in infancy are often frustrated•.27  Therefore, some critics suggest that
patients treated as infants whose treatment was cloaked with secrecy
should be recontacted so that they can be provided with complete
medical information.276 To the extent that new knowledge of J/J's case
suggests that ongoing medical and psychological risks can be alleviated
or lessened by more medical information, practitioners may have con-
tinuing ethical and legal duties to their former patients.
2 7
272. See Diamond & Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment, supra note 11, at 303; see also Dre-
ger, supra note 12, at 30, 33-34; see generally, Preves, supra note 218.
273. See, e.g., Preves, supra note 218, at 415 (reporting on fear of cancer as a result of
incomplete medical information); Groveman, supra note 84, at 357-58.
274. See Intersex Society of North America, Frequently Asked Questions: Hormone Replace-
ment Therapy and Osteoporosis, (visited July 15, 1999) <http:/www.isna.org/faq/
htm> (warning that persons who have had their gonads removed in childhood are at
exceptionally high risk of osteoporosis.
275. See Morgan Holmes, Is growing up in silence better than growing up different? 2
CHRYSALIS: THE JOURNAL OF TRANSGRESSrWE GENDER IDENTITIES 7-9 (1997/1998)
(describing mental disturbance and suicidal ideation); see, e.g., Cowley, supra note 74,
at 66 (discussing case of Cheryl Chase, "not only was [she] denied information as a
child but was lied to by doctors when she later tried to obtain her medical records,");
Colapinto, supra note 11, at 95 (recounting incidents of secrecy and resulting psy-
chological pain and suffering).
276. See generally, Diamond, Pediatric Management, supra note 87, at 1026
(recommending that physicians "find ways to own up to these adults, initiating dis-
closure of medical histories that have been concealed"); Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric
Ethics, supra note 11, at 406-07 (same)
277. See, e.g., Blaz v. Galen Hosp. Illinois, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 556, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(noting that where there is a continuing duty the cause of action does not accrue un-
til the defendant "had sufficient facts to understand that its treatment had placed
[the] plaintiff at risk"); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Ill,
1978) (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. App. 1972)) (recognizing
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CONCLUSION
We introduced this article with stories of two young men. One had
contemplated a law suit against the physicians but was dissuaded when
he learned that the medical malpractice standard in his state protected
physicians who followed community standards of practice. The other
young man was just discovering what occurred when he was a child.278
Their stories are remarkably similar to J/J's. Only through persistent
medical detective work provoked by their inherent feelings of not be-
longing to their assigned gender were they able to learn of the failed
surgical treatment that they had undergone in childhood. Neither par-
ents nor physicians provided information until confronted.279 Like J/J,
ongoing duties to notify women of cancer risks related to treatment with DES dis-
covered after treatment); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536, 541 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (holding that veteran's hospital has duty to inform patient of newly discovered
risks associated with prior treatment); Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 394
(Cal. App. 1978) (holding that doctor had continuing duty to warn of later discov-
ered risks associated with Dalkon Shield and statute of limitations was inapplicable);
Reyes v. Anka Research Ltd., 443 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (noting that
cause of action for failing to notify patient of recall of IJUD continued until the time
of reasonable discovery). But see Schendt v. Dewey, 520 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Neb.
1994) (holding that there is no duty to warn of cancer risks from radiation following
termination of the physician-patient relationship). See generally Lori B. Andrews,
Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risks,
29 Hous. L. REv. 149, 169 (1992) (discussing on-going duties to warn where genetic
testing later reveals other as-yet-unknown links to diseases and carrier states); Andrea
G. Nadel, Annotation, Duty of Medical Practitioner to Warn Patient of Subsequently
Discovered Danger From Treatment Previously Given, 12 A.L.R.4th 41 (1981 & 1997
Supp.).
278. He explained, "the conclusion was that the doctors at the time of my birth did the
best they knew how to do." Interview with Name Withheld on March 16, 1999.
279. One of the young men discussed above, sex reassigned at two months of age due to a
micropenis, learned of his surgical procedures during family therapy in his teen years.
This marked a turning point in his relationship with his parents, who then supported
his decision to live as a man. He remains close to them. He reports that for a long
time he felt, "how could you do this to me?... If they had known I was born as a
boy, they wouldn't have raised me as a girl." He also explained that he never felt he
was a girl, "When I was ten, I asked my mother if God makes mistakes." "My mother
was left in the dark as much as I was [about my condition]." The doctors told his
parents his testes were cancerous (although they were not). His parents were not clear
at the time that he was born a boy, although he later learned that genetic tests at the
time revealed he had a normal 46 XY karyotype a micropenis and normal testes. In-
terview with Name Witheld, on May 30, 1999.
The other learned of his medical history by confronting his physicians. He is
now estranged from his parents. Interview with Name Withheld 2, on October 25,
1999.
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each young adult now faces a lifetime of medical and surgical treatment
to restore himself to his preferred gender.
What would a jury's reaction be if it were to judge the standard of
care that clinicians employed in these cases? In jurisdictions rejecting
Helling v. Carey and the application of ordinary negligence principles to
malpractice actions, tort law renders itself impotent to hold the medical
community accountable for decisions based on failed medical standards
or to be an agent for change. These jurisdictions presume that the medi-
cal profession's internal safeguards sufficiently protect the public and
that the standards so developed deserve judicial deference. Jurisdictions
rejecting Helling presume that the medical community's standard of
care springs from collective wisdom and not from collective ignorance.
It is in these circumstances especially that the wisdom of Judge Hand
rings most true.
Fortunately, the informed consent doctrine has more potential to
change collective practices. The practice of deception and secrecy was
never ethically well-grounded. Especially in those jurisdictions that have
adopted a patient-oriented standard to judge informed consent, the
counseling approach clinicians employed in the past is not defensible.
The informed consent doctrine requires physicians to reveal material
data including risks, efficacy and alternatives to patients, or their par-
ents, in order to allow them to make informed decisions. The patient-
oriented standard leaves little room for the inaccuracy and secrecy for-
merly employed in advising parents and patients. Providing parents
with a fuller explanation of the risks, including the recently-reported
failures of treatment and information about the successful adaptation of
individuals raised without surgery, may well curb parental consent. Af-
ter all, few parents would probably consent to such extensive treatment
if physicians reveal that there is no scientific evidence supporting the
premise on which treatment is based and that the child may ultimately
reject the treatment and be left worse off for having undergone it.280
Finally, a fuller airing of the ethical dimensions of treatment and
the duties of informed consent may prompt a more cautious approachto sugica " . 281
to surgical intervention. Recognizing the child's right to an open fu-
280. But see Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 94-97 (describing parents' decision to consent
to surgery recommended by surgeons even after meeting members of ISNA and
learning of risk of rejection of the assigned gender, potential loss of sexual sensitivity,
and meeting dissatisfied former patients and no satisfied ones).
281. See KESSLER, supra note 12, at 75-76; Catlin, supra note 258, at 65; Diamond &
Sigmundson, Management of Intersexuality, supra note 11, at 1047; Dreger, supra
note 12, at 34; Kipnis & Diamond, Pediatric Ethics, supra note 11, at 405-407.
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ture as part of the decisional calculation may yield a more measured ap-
proach in these difficult cases. Waiting to see what the child desires is
the most sensible approach because, as it has been often stated: the most
important sex organ is between the ears rather than between the
legs. 282 t
Unfortunately, Dreger notes that ethicists have historically not been included in
this debate. See Dreger, supra note 12, at 26 (noting the scant attention to the ethical
issues until now). Times are changing, as evidenced by the devotion of an entire issue
on this topic in the Journal of Clinical Ethics in 1998.
282. Milton Diamond, Sel-Testing: A Check on Sexual Identity and Other Levels of Sexual-
ity, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 106, at 122.
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